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TIME TO RELOAD: THE HARMS OF THE 
FEDERAL FELON-IN-POSSESSION BAN IN A 
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ZACH SHERWOOD† 
ABSTRACT 
  Federal law permanently prohibits anyone who has been convicted 
of a felony from possessing a firearm. Keeping lethal weapons out of 
the hands of those who pose a risk to public safety is no doubt a worthy 
policy goal. But the federal felon-in-possession ban is blunt, punitive, 
and supremely damaging to the ex-felons who fall within its ambit. The 
statute’s sweeping scope ensures that any ex-felon who possesses any 
firearm for any length of time for any reason can be swiftly and harshly 
punished. And it indiscriminately targets conduct that is often neither 
harmful nor criminal. 
  The felon-in-possession ban gained constitutional significance 
following the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in District of 
Columbia v. Heller. The Heller Court recognized for the first time an 
individual Second Amendment right to possess a firearm for self-
defense in the home. Yet by imposing substantial criminal liability on 
any form of firearm possession by an ex-felon, the felon-in-possession 
ban categorically strips a sizable portion of Americans of this very 
same right. 
  This Note argues that it is high time to rethink the federal felon-in-
possession ban’s role in a post-Heller world. It argues that the statute’s 
expansive reach is poorly tailored to addressing gun violence and 
highlights the weak doctrinal foundation on which the felon-in-
possession ban is built. But this Note goes further than most existing 
scholarship by also examining the tangible, on-the-ground harms that 
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the felon-in-possession ban inflicts on ex-felons and their 
communities—from needlessly complicating ex-felons’ reintegration 
into society, to burdening the Second Amendment rights of nonfelon 
family members, to effectively disarming large swaths of communities 
of color. Change is needed, and this Note recommends statutory 
reforms and constitutional challenges that would circumscribe the 
felon-in-possession ban’s scope. 
INTRODUCTION 
Suppose you have a felony conviction on your record.1 If 
committing any sort of heinous crime seems unthinkable, then consider 
something more pedestrian—perhaps you have a handful of drug 
possession charges from your younger years,2 once rashly punched 
someone during a fight,3 or cashed a few Social Security checks that 
continued to arrive in the mail after your elderly mother passed away,4 
all of which qualify as a felony. And for good measure, say you 
managed to avoid spending a single night in jail.5 In your case, a fine6 
or brief period of probation7 was punishment enough. 
Now suppose that a police officer, while responding to a domestic 
disturbance at your residence8 or patting you down as part of a routine 
frisk,9 happens to stumble upon a firearm in your home or on your 
person. Or perhaps your probation officer, while conducting a 
 
 1. See Felony, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A serious crime usu. 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or by death.”). 
 2. See United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 769 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (affirming 
the felon-in-possession conviction of a defendant with a handful of prior drug convictions). 
 3. See Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 982 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (upholding the application of 
the federal felon-in-possession ban to a defendant who was convicted of assault and battery after 
a fistfight forty-five years earlier). 
 4. See 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(4) (2018) (punishing such Social Security fraud with a prison 
sentence of up to five years). 
 5. See Schrader, 704 F.3d at 983 (emphasizing that the defendant’s conviction of 
misdemeanor assault and battery did not subject him to any jail time). 
 6. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(a) (2018) (“A defendant [in federal court] who has been found 
guilty of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine.”). 
 7. See id. § 3561 (authorizing a “sentence[] to a term of probation” for federal infractions, 
misdemeanors, and certain felonies). 
 8. See United States v. Bartelho, 71 F.3d 436, 438–39 (1st Cir. 1995) (recounting a police 
search during a domestic disturbance dispatch that discovered a firearm within an ex-felon’s 
apartment). 
 9. See United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1113–14 (9th Cir. 2010) (detailing a personal 
search of the defendant by a police officer that led to a felon-in-possession charge). 
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warrantless search of your bedroom,10 finds the pistol you keep in your 
nightstand just in case you ever need to ward off an intruder. Or maybe 
a police detective discovers a few photos of you flaunting a handgun on 
your Facebook profile.11 Regardless of whether the gun is yours or 
someone else’s, whether it was a gift or lawfully purchased, whether it 
is a handgun or a hunting rifle, or whether your felony conviction 
occurred two years ago or twenty, you could be easily convicted of a 
serious federal offense.12 
Since 1968, federal law has prohibited any person convicted of a 
crime “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” 
from possessing a firearm.13 The scope of this felon-in-possession ban, 
which is codified in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), is expansive. It encompasses 
ex-felons convicted of violent and nonviolent crimes alike, and the 
statute’s prohibition on firearm possession lasts for life.14 The ban is 
also robustly enforced. Firearms offenses, as a class, are the third most 
common type of conviction in the federal system,15 and roughly one in 
ten federal convictions involves a violation of the felon-in-possession 
ban.16 Punishment for violating the ban can be harsh. An ex-felon can 
face a prison sentence of up to a decade,17 with the average sentence 
 
 10. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987) (holding that a warrantless search by a 
probation officer of a probationer’s home, which uncovered a gun and resulted in the probationer 
being convicted of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 11. See United States v. Farrad, 895 F.3d 859, 864–65 (6th Cir. 2018) (describing a felon-in-
possession conviction which relied on evidence generated by a police search of the defendant’s 
Facebook profile). 
 12. See infra Part II.A. 
 13. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2018). 
 14. See infra Part II.A. 
 15. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS 45 (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2019/2019-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf 
[perma.cc/J4B7-7CDP]. 
 16. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: FELON IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM 1 (2020) 
[hereinafter FY 2019 Quick Facts], https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/quick-facts/Felon_In_Possession_FY19.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC49-TL6M]. 
 17. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). While the maximum sentence for a standalone violation of § 922(g)(1) 
is ten years, id., under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), any defendant convicted under  
§ 922(g)(1) who also has three previous convictions for a “violent felony or a serious drug offense,” as 
defined by the ACCA, is instead subject to a statutory minimum sentence of fifteen years and a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment, id. § 924(e)(1). 
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exceeding five years.18 And a conviction under § 922(g)(1) is generally 
easy to prove.19 The government need only establish that a defendant 
with any felony conviction possessed any firearm whatsoever for any 
duration of time for any reason.20 The trier of fact is left with an 
uncomplicated decision: a person with a felony record either did or did 
not possess a firearm.21 Case closed. 
The federal felon-in-possession ban is blunt and punitive for a 
reason. In theory, it aims to prevent a “presumptively risky” group of 
people22—namely, individuals who have broken the law and therefore 
pose an enduring risk to public safety—from wielding lethal weapons.23 
The modern ban and its early twentieth-century precursors were 
explicitly passed, in fact, to address the violence and criminal activity 
associated with firearms.24 
But any law like § 922(g)(1) that facilitates the lengthy 
reincarceration of ex-felons also comes with attendant harms, and the 
specific harms imposed by the federal felon-in-possession ban gained 
constitutional significance following the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision in District of Columbia v. Heller.25 There, the Court held for 
 
 18. FY 2019 Quick Facts, supra note 16, at 2. The average sentence for defendants convicted 
under § 922(g)(1) who were also subject to an ACCA enhancement is 188 months, and the 
average sentence for those who do not face an ACCA enhancement is 58 months. Id. 
 19. See infra Part II.A. 
 20. See, e.g., United States v. Teemer, 394 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that § 922(g)(1) 
“bans possession [of a firearm] outright without regard to how great a danger exists of misuse in 
the particular case”). 
 21. In fiscal year 2019, 97.7 percent of defendants convicted under § 922(g)(1) were men. FY 
2019 Quick Facts, supra note 16, at 1. Accordingly, this Note defaults to masculine pronouns when 
referring to ex-felons impacted by the federal felon-in-possession ban. This is done solely for 
simplicity and clarity. 
 22. United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 23. See Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 448 (7th Cir. 2019) (recognizing § 922(g)(1)’s purpose 
as “preventing gun violence by keeping firearms away from persons, such as those convicted of 
serious crimes, who might be expected to misuse them”). 
 24. See JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A. H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND 
AMENDMENT 42–50 (2018) (describing the history of modern federal firearms regulations); see 
also, e.g., Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 1201, 82 
Stat. 197, 236 (stating that “[t]he Congress hereby finds and declares that the receipt, possession, 
or transportation of a firearm by felons” constitutes, among other things, a “threat to the safety 
of the President of the United States and Vice President of the United States” as well as a “threat 
to the continued and effective operation of the Government of the United States and of the 
government of each State”); id. § 901, 82 Stat. at 225 (declaring in part that the “ease with which” 
criminals can obtain firearms “is a significant factor in the prevalence of lawlessness and violent 
crime in the United States”). 
 25. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
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the first time that the Second Amendment guarantee of “the right of 
the people to keep and bear Arms”26 extends to the private use of 
firearms for self-defense in the home.27 Yet, by criminalizing firearm 
possession for ex-felons, § 922(g)(1) effectively prohibits a substantial 
number of Americans from exercising this very same constitutional 
right.28  
The Heller majority attempted to square this circle by asserting in 
passing that nothing in the Court’s opinion should “cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons”29 
and other “presumptively lawful” gun regulations.30 The Court then 
bridged the yawning doctrinal gap between these broad exceptions and 
the Court’s grounding of its newly minted constitutional right in the 
“inherent right of self-defense” by insisting that the Second 
Amendment’s protections extended only to “law-abiding, responsible 
citizens.”31 And lower federal courts, relying on this language, have 
routinely rejected Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1)’s 
constitutionality post-Heller,32 either by citing the Heller majority’s 
“presumptively lawful” language33 or concluding that the felon-in-
possession ban survives the appropriate level of constitutional 
scrutiny.34  
Many scholars note the tension between Heller’s proclamation of 
a fundamental right purportedly belonging to “all members of the 
 
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 27. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.  
 28. See Sarah K.S. Shannon, Christopher Uggen, Jason Schnittker, Melissa Thompson, Sara 
Wakefield & Michael Massoglia, The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distribution of People with 
Felony Records in the United States, 1948–2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 1795, 1806, 1808 (2017) 
(estimating that roughly 8 percent of the U.S. adult population has a felony conviction, which 
equates to approximately nineteen million people). 
 29. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
 30. Id. at 627 n.26. 
 31. Id. at 635. 
 32. See infra Part I.B. 
 33. E.g., United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009). But see id. at 1049 
(Tymkovich, J., concurring) (expressing concern that the Supreme Court’s “summary treatment 
of felon dispossession in dictum [in Heller] forecloses the possibility of a more sophisticated 
interpretation of  
§ 922(g)(1)’s scope”). 
 34. See, e.g., Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 991 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (upholding § 922(g)(1)’s 
constitutionality for being “substantially related to the important governmental objective of crime 
prevention”). 
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political community”35 and its uncritical approval of laws like 
§ 922(g)(1) that categorically exclude ex-felons from the Second 
Amendment’s reach.36 But the scholarship has largely focused on 
whether the federal felon-in-possession ban and similar firearm 
restrictions are justified by history or the Constitution’s text.37  
This Note takes a more practical approach to evaluating the 
federal felon-in-possession ban by focusing on the statute’s concrete, 
on-the-ground effects beyond the dignified confines of the academy or 
an appellate courtroom.38 It argues that § 922(g)(1)’s sweeping scope 
ensures that the statute indiscriminately punishes conduct that is often 
unrelated to criminal activity.39 It also addresses how the felon-in-
possession ban is built on a weak doctrinal foundation.40 But this Note 
goes further than most existing scholarship by also examining the 
tangible harms that § 922(g)(1) exacts on ex-felons, their family 
members, and their communities. It describes three such harms in 
detail.41 First, § 922(g)(1) burdens ex-felons’ reintegration into society 
 
 35. Heller, 554 U.S. at 580. 
 36. See, e.g., Darrell A. H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second 
Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1292 (2009) (describing the Heller opinion as “one that 
boldly sallies forth to pronounce the triumph of individual rights under the Second Amendment, 
but soon breaks into confusion and disarray when pressed on the scope of this new right and 
finally retreats into a series of muttered exceptions that its earlier reasoning does not support”); 
Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1561 (2009) (describing Heller’s 
“presumptively lawful” prohibitions as a “laundry list” of Second Amendment exceptions that 
the Heller Court “simply offered up with no discussion whatsoever about how these exceptions 
comply with the Founders’ understanding of the right to keep and bear arms”); see also Joseph 
Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 375, 413 (2009) (arguing that Heller’s categorical exclusion of certain types of people from 
the Second Amendment’s protections “neither reflects nor enables a coherent account of the [] 
Amendment’s core values, whatever they may be”); Carlton F. W. Larson, Four Exceptions in 
Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 
1372 (2008) (exploring the implications of the Heller exceptions to future regulation of the Second 
Amendment); Sanford Levinson, Comment on Ruben and Blocher: Too Damn Many Cases, and 
an Absent Supreme Court, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 17, 29 (2018) (questioning the proper 
interpretation of Heller in light of the tension between the fundamental right recognized in the 
case and the limitation of that right to convicted felons). 
 37. See, e.g., Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173, 2219–20 (2016) 
(“[T]he focal point of many gun rights advocates and gun control proponents has become an 
ostensibly apolitical space of historical and textual interpretation. Rather than examining the 
effects of various extant or proposed gun statutes, scholars and courts have become preoccupied 
with eighteenth-century views of gun ownership.”). 
 38. See id. (describing and critiquing the recent shift in scholarly treatment of gun regulations 
“from studies of the law in action to careful examinations of the law on the books”). 
 39. See infra Part II.B. 
 40. See infra Part II.C.  
 41. See infra Part III. 
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by effectively precluding them from living in any residence where guns 
are lawfully kept. Second, the statute’s harms are not limited to ex-
felons alone—the robust enforcement of the federal felon-in-
possession ban also forces nonfelons to choose between exercising 
their own right to possess a firearm for self-defense and living with 
loved ones who have a felony record. Third, § 922(g)(1) 
disproportionately impacts and disarms communities of color.  
Importantly, this Note does not mean to suggest that restricting 
access to deadly firearms by individuals who pose a realistic threat to 
public safety is an unworthy government interest. Rather, by 
highlighting the grave harms caused by the federal felon-in-possession 
ban in its current form, this Note hopes to inspire efforts to challenge 
this sweeping and punitive statute that all too often re-ensnares 
members of a disfavored group in the criminal justice system. 
Part I reviews the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Heller, 
the case’s impact on the federal felon-in-possession ban, and lower 
courts’ subsequent treatment of § 922(g)(1). Part II describes 
§ 922(g)(1) and the elements that must be proved to support a 
conviction. It then explains how  
§ 922(g)(1)’s sweeping scope causes innocent conduct to fall within its 
ambit and addresses the post-Heller constitutional dimensions of the 
ban, including the less-than-compelling reasoning the Heller Court 
used to justify the statute’s continued punishment of conduct that is 
otherwise constitutionally protected. Part III discusses three distinct 
tangible harms that § 922(g)(1) inflicts on ex-felons and their 
communities. Finally, Part IV proposes solutions that may help to 
mitigate the damage caused by § 922(g)(1), including recommended 
statutory changes and potential constitutional challenges.  
I.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 
Throughout most of American history, laws regulating the 
possession of firearms were not a matter of constitutional concern. The 
Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”42 And this text had long been 
understood to encompass only matters related to “the preservation or 
 
 42. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
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efficiency of a well regulated militia.”43 Under this interpretation, the 
Second Amendment thus had nothing to say about the federal felon-
in-possession ban and other laws that similarly regulated private gun 
use.44 As this Part explains, however, that all changed following the 
Heller decision. But although Heller fundamentally transformed 
Second Amendment jurisprudence, its practical effect on gun control 
laws like § 922(g)(1) has been far less consequential.45 Indeed, defining 
the precise contours of the Second Amendment right has been left 
almost exclusively to lower courts, who in turn have uniformly upheld 
the ban against challenges to its constitutionality.46 The upshot of this 
doctrinal development is that tens of millions of Americans remain 
categorically prohibited from exercising the Second Amendment right 
that Heller extolled.47 
A. District of Columbia v. Heller: A Turning Point 
In 2002, Dick Heller, a special police officer at the Thurgood 
Marshall Judiciary Center in Washington, D.C., attempted to register 
a handgun that he wanted to keep at home for self-defense.48 But 
 
 43. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). Professors Joseph Blocher & Darrell 
A. H. Miller helpfully summarize the history of the militia-based interpretation of the Second 
Amendment as follows: 
The militia-based reading of the Amendment holds that the right to keep and bear arms 
is generally limited to people, arms, and activities having some connection to the 
militia. As a matter of doctrine, this view prevailed for more than two centuries, 
meaning that most Second Amendment challenges were dismissed on the basis that the 
person bringing the challenge had no plausible connection to a militia, let alone a well-
regulated one. 
BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 24, at 59.  
 44. See, e.g., Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Since [Miller], the lower 
federal courts have uniformly held that the Second Amendment preserves a collective, rather 
than individual, right.”); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 1992) (“The rule 
emerging from Miller is that, absent a showing that the possession of a certain weapon has ‘some 
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia,’ the Second 
Amendment does not guarantee the right to possess the weapon.” (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 
178)). But see United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 220–27 (5th Cir. 2001) (arguing that Miller’s 
holding was not grounded in a militia-based interpretation of the Second Amendment).  
 45. See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 24, at 99 (“Heller’s practical impact on the scope of 
gun regulation has been, and likely will continue to be, somewhat muted.”). 
 46. Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Right To Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1481 (2018). 
 47. See Shannon et al., supra note 28, at 1806, 1808 (estimating that nearly twenty million 
American adults have a felony conviction that would disqualify them from lawfully possessing 
firearms). 
 48. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 575 (2008). 
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District of Columbia law at the time completely barred the registration 
of handguns, and his request was summarily rejected.49 Heller 
subsequently filed suit to bring a Second Amendment challenge 
against the District’s handgun ban.50  
In a five–four decision that forever altered the constitutional 
landscape, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment 
protects an “individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of 
confrontation” wholly separate from militia service.51 Because the 
District’s handgun ban prevented “law-abiding, responsible citizens” 
from effectively exercising this “core” Second Amendment right “to 
use arms in defense of hearth and home,” the Court struck it down as 
unconstitutional.52 
Two features of this newfound individual right to keep and bear 
arms stand out. First, the Court identified self-defense as the “central 
component” of the Second Amendment right, one which was itself 
rooted in a natural right to self-preservation that predated the 
Founding.53 Second, keeping firearms for the “core lawful purpose of 
self-defense” was grounded in the home, where the “need for defense 
of self, family, and property is most acute.”54   
Crucially, the Heller majority stressed that the right to keep and 
bear arms is not “unlimited.”55 Despite suggesting this right “belongs 
to all Americans,”56 the Court qualified the Second Amendment’s 
protections by extending them only to “law-abiding, responsible 
citizens.”57 The Court also made a point of emphasizing that:  
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and 
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 575–76. For an overview of Heller’s procedural history and the characters involved 
in the litigation, see BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 24, at 66–71. 
 51. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. 
 52. Id. at 628–30, 635. 
 53. Id. at 592–93, 599, 630. 
 54. Id. at 628, 630. 
 55. Id. at 626. 
 56. Id. at 581. 
 57. See id. at 635 (characterizing the Second Amendment right as that of “law-abiding, 
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home”). 
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places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing 
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.58 
Its ardent assertion of an individual right to possess firearms 
notwithstanding, the Heller Court implied with a single sentence that 
practically all gun control measures extant at the time—including the 
federal felon-in-possession ban—were “presumptively lawful.”59 
Besides determining that the District of Columbia’s handgun ban 
went too far,60 the Heller Court clarified little else about the scope and 
substance of the Second Amendment right.61 Relevant here, the 
majority offered almost no insight into why ex-felons should be 
excluded from the Second Amendment’s protections62 or how lower 
courts should review challenges to laws that categorically criminalize 
gun possession.63 The Court left such questions for another day.64 
B. The Federal Felon-In-Possession Ban Post-Heller: A Continuation 
Having broken new constitutional ground, the Heller decision 
prompted a wave of litigation targeting various gun control regulations 
nationwide.65 In the first eight years following the decision, federal trial 
 
 58. Id. at 626–27. 
 59. Id. at 627 n.26; see also Winkler, supra note 36, at 1561 (“So while forcefully declaring an 
individual right to keep and bear arms, the [Heller] Court suggest[ed] that nearly all gun control 
laws currently on the books are constitutionally permissible.”). 
 60. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629. 
 61. See, e.g., BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 24, at 84–90 (describing the “significant 
challenges, contradictions, and questions” faced by lower courts in defining the “basic building 
blocks of the Second Amendment” post-Heller); Levinson, supra note 36, at 20 (claiming that “no 
serious person could believe that Heller clarified very much at all” beyond invalidating the District 
of Columbia’s handgun ban). 
 62. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]he Court offer[ed] no 
way to harmonize its conflicting pronouncements” regarding who the Second Amendment 
protects); see also Winkler, supra note 36, at 1564 (“The Court didn’t give any substantive 
explanation for why the types of laws mentioned in the laundry list [of exceptions to the Second 
Amendment right] were constitutional aside from a description of them as ‘longstanding.’”). 
 63. The Heller majority explicitly rejected rational basis review and a “balancing test” 
proposed by Justice Stephen Breyer in his dissent, but it otherwise did not specify the appropriate 
level of scrutiny to apply to laws burdening the Second Amendment right. Id. at 628 n.27, 634–35 
(majority opinion); see also United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting 
that “Heller left open the level of scrutiny applicable to review a law that burdens conduct 
protected under the Second Amendment”). 
 64. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“[T]here will be time enough to expound upon the historical 
justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned if and when those exceptions come before 
us.”). 
 65. Winkler, supra note 36, at 1565–67. 
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and appellate courts collectively resolved over seven hundred separate 
Second Amendment challenges.66 Yet the Supreme Court, in stark 
contrast, has remained aloof from the gun rights debate it ignited,67 
having decided only three other cases implicating the Second 
Amendment since Heller.68 And none of these three cases expanded on 
Heller’s reasoning or even grappled with Second Amendment doctrine 
directly.69 
This reticence by the Court means that lower federal courts have 
had near-exclusive freedom to shape Second Amendment doctrine 
post-Heller.70 And while the types of challenged regulations have 
varied widely, the outcomes of these cases have not. Lower federal 
courts have overwhelmingly rejected Second Amendment challenges 
in favor of upholding a wide variety of gun control laws,71 rejecting 
challenges in more than 90 percent of cases from 2008–2016.72 
The federal felon-in-possession ban has not fared any differently. 
Under the two-step inquiry that has emerged as the applicable test for 
Second Amendment challenges to firearms regulations,73 federal 
 
 66. Ruben & Blocher, supra note 46, at 1472–73. 
 67. See Levinson, supra note 36, at 26 (“The justices of the Supreme Court have clearly 
chosen, for their own individual and unexpressed reasons, to withdraw from molding Second 
Amendment doctrine.”). 
 68. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (per curiam); 
Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) (per curiam); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 
U.S. 742 (2012). 
 69. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. at 1526 (dismissing as moot a challenge to 
a New York statute regarding the transportation of firearms to and from a gun owner’s home); 
Caetano, 136 S. Ct. at 1027–28 (holding that stun guns, despite not being in common use at the 
time of the Second Amendment’s enactment, were protected under the Second Amendment); 
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 806 (plurality opinion) (incorporating the Second Amendment to the 
states under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). 
 70. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 46, at 1455 (noting that the Second Amendment’s 
“doctrinal development” has been left “primarily to the lower courts”). 
 71. See id. at 1472 (“[T]he vast majority of Second Amendment claims fail.”). A notable 
exception to this general trend is the relative success rate of challenges to public carry restrictions. 
Id. at 1484; see also, e.g., Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(striking down a D.C. law requiring a “good reason” for concealed carry licenses as violative of 
the Second Amendment).  
 72. Ruben & Blocher, supra note 46, at 1472. 
 73. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 254 (2d Cir. 2015) (describing 
the two-part inquiry and noting at least nine other circuits that have adopted the same approach). 
Under this two-step inquiry, the first question is one of coverage: Is the conduct being restricted 
(e.g., owning an assault rifle) “protected by the Second Amendment in the first place?” Ezell v. 
City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701 (7th Cir. 2011). If history or Heller’s list of “longstanding,” 
“presumptively lawful” restrictions suggests that such conduct is excluded from the Second 
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courts of appeals have universally held that the federal felon-in-
possession ban does not violate the Second Amendment as defined in 
Heller.74 In rejecting facial challenges to § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality, 
some courts have reflexively cited Heller’s list of “presumptively lawful 
regulatory measures” while saying little else to justify the categorical 
exclusion of ex-felons from the Second Amendment’s protections.75 
Others, like the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Vongxay,76 have held 
that the felon-in-possession ban passes constitutional muster because 
it targets a group that falls outside of the Second Amendment’s 
protections entirely.77 Indeed, courts have regularly defined the “core 
right identified in Heller” as the “right of [] law-abiding, responsible 
citizen[s] to possess and carry a weapon for self-defense”78—a 
definition that, by its terms, wholly excludes ex-felons. And still more 
courts have indicated that the statute’s ends justify its expansive means. 
In Schrader v. Holder,79 for instance, the D.C. Circuit held that the 
government had “carried its burden” under the applicable level of 
intermediate scrutiny by demonstrating a “substantial relationship” 
 
Amendment’s scope, the inquiry ends, and the regulation is upheld. Id. at 701–03 (quoting District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626, 627 n.26 (2008)). If, however, the challenged regulation 
does in fact burden conduct protected by the Second Amendment, courts then evaluate whether 
the regulation “passes muster under the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny.” Heller v. 
District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011). In these cases, courts 
overwhelmingly apply some form of intermediate scrutiny. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 46, 
at 1496 (finding that “[i]ntermediate scrutiny has been the most prevalent form of scrutiny” 
applied to Second Amendment challenges in federal courts). 
 74. See Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting that “every federal court of 
appeals to address the issue has held that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment on 
its face” and collecting cases from eleven circuits).  
 75. See, e.g., United States v. Khami, 362 F. App’x 501, 507–08 (6th Cir. 2010) (agreeing with 
other circuits that Heller’s “longstanding prohibitions” language is “sufficient to dispose of the 
claim that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional”); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th 
Cir. 2009) (disposing of a constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1) in a single sentence by citing 
Heller’s “longstanding prohibitions” language); United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 n.6 
(5th Cir. 2009) (same). 
 76. United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 77. See id. at 1115 (“[F]elons are categorically different from the individuals who have a 
fundamental right to bear arms . . . .”). 
 78. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Medina v. Whitaker, 
913 F.3d 152, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“At its core, the Amendment protects the right of ‘law-abiding, 
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.’” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 
635)). 
 79. Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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between the felon-in-possession ban and the “important objective” of 
crime prevention.80 
While the circuit courts have uniformly held that the federal felon-
in-possession ban is constitutional on its face, they are split on whether 
an ex-felon can raise an as-applied challenge.81 Five circuits have 
foreclosed such challenges entirely, meaning that the felon-in-
possession ban is constitutional as applied to violent and nonviolent ex-
felons alike, “regardless of their individual circumstances or the nature 
of their offenses.”82 Six other circuits have left open the possibility of 
as-applied challenges,83 with a challenger’s success depending largely 
on whether he has committed an offense “serious” enough to render 
him an “unvirtuous citizen” who is beyond the Second Amendment’s 
scope.84 Yet in these six circuits, only once has a court of appeals held 
the federal felon-in-possession ban unconstitutional as applied to a 
particular defendant.85 Thus, even when an as-applied challenge to 
 
 80. Id. at 990; see also Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 448 (7th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he government 
has shown that prohibiting even nonviolent felons . . . from possessing firearms is substantially 
related to its interest in preventing gun violence.”). 
 81. For instance, in Kanter, the plaintiff claimed that his status as a nonviolent offender with 
no criminal record beyond a mail fraud conviction meant that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as 
applied to him. 919 F.3d at 440. 
 82. See id. at 442 (noting that the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have 
suggested that § 922(g)(1) is “always constitutional” as applied to ex-felons “as a class”). 
 83. See id. at 443 (noting that the First, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits 
“have left room for as-applied challenges” to § 922(g)(1)). 
 84. Holloway v. Att’y Gen., 948 F.3d 164, 171 (3d Cir. 2020).  
 85. See Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 339–40 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (holding in a 
highly fractured decision that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to a misdemeanant who 
had pleaded guilty to corrupting a minor eighteen years earlier and to another misdemeanant who 
had pleaded guilty to unlawfully carrying a handgun without a license twenty-six years earlier). 
Eight of the fifteen judges on the en banc Third Circuit held that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional 
as applied to the two challengers in the case. Id. at 339, 343 (opinion of Ambro, J.); id. at 357 
(Hardiman, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgments). The other seven judges would 
have rejected the as-applied challenge in the case and questioned the validity of such challenges 
more generally. Id. at 407–11 (Fuentes, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting 
from the judgments). A separate majority of eleven judges, however, concluded that the test for 
whether an individual challenger could prevail with an as-applied challenge depended on the 
seriousness of the challenger’s prior conviction, which determined whether the challenger was an 
“unvirtuous” citizen beyond the Second Amendment’s protections. Id. at 348–49 (opinion of 
Ambro, J.); id. at 387 (Fuentes, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting from the 
judgments). The remaining five judges would have instead based the test on whether a prior 
conviction was violent. Id. at 369 (Hardiman, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgments). 
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§ 922(g)(1) is available, the odds of a successful one are vanishingly 
slim.  
II.  THE FEDERAL FELON-IN-POSSESSION BAN 
While the contours of the Second Amendment right continue to 
evolve, the federal felon-in-possession ban has been a stable fixture in 
the federal gun control regime for over half a century. Federal law 
prohibits any person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by 
more than a year in prison from purchasing or possessing a firearm.86 
And, as explained above, the Heller Court declared that its decision in 
no way calls this statute’s constitutionality into question.  
This Part focuses on the federal felon-in-possession ban itself—its 
elements, its sweeping scope, and its constitutional dimensions in light 
of Heller. This Part starts by explaining that § 922(g)(1), as currently 
interpreted and enforced, all but ensures that anyone with a felony 
conviction who possesses a gun can be easily, unconditionally, and 
harshly punished. It then argues that § 922(g)(1) is poorly designed to 
address gun violence because the statute’s sweeping scope often results 
in ex-felons being punished for conduct that is neither harmful nor 
criminal and because the statute indiscriminately treats nonviolent 
offenders like violent ones. The Part concludes by describing how the 
felon-in-possession ban acquired constitutional significance after 
Heller while also noting that the reasons courts have offered for 
upholding the statute’s constitutionality post-Heller are far from 
compelling as a doctrinal matter. 
A. The Statute and Its Elements 
The felon-in-possession ban prohibits “any person . . . who has 
been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year” from possessing “any firearm or 
ammunition” that is “in or affecting commerce.”87 Anyone who 
 
 86. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2018). Most states have a state-law equivalent of the federal felon-
in-possession ban. See Who Can Have a Gun: Firearm Prohibitions, GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO 
PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE [hereinafter GIFFORDS L. CTR.], https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-
laws/policy-areas/who-can-have-a-gun/categories-of-prohibited-people [https://perma.cc/26ZF-
FW9C] (listing federal and state laws regulating who can own firearms). This Note, however, 
focuses exclusively on § 922(g)(1). 
 87. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
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“knowingly” violates § 922(g)(1) can be fined, “imprisoned not more 
than 10 years, or both.”88 
Congress enacted the statute in its current form in 1968,89 and 
federal prosecutions for weapons violations increased precipitously in 
the decades that followed.90 And the felon-in-possession ban, in 
particular, continues to be vigorously enforced. More than 7,600 
offenders were convicted under § 922(g)(1) in fiscal year 2019, which 
constituted roughly 10 percent of all federal convictions.91 Firearms 
offenses, moreover, are the third most common type of crime for which 
offenders are convicted in the federal system, behind only immigration 
and drug offenses.92 The relatively high number of § 922(g)(1) 
convictions can be partly attributed to the ease of convicting a 
defendant.93 The government must prove only (1) that the defendant 
has a qualifying prior felony conviction; (2) that he knew of his felony 
status; (3) that he knowingly possessed a firearm at some point; and (4) 
that the firearm was in or affecting commerce.94 And because courts 
 
 88. Id. § 924(a)(2). This statute is a general scienter provision that applies to § 922(g) as a 
whole. Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2195–96 (2019). The government therefore must 
show that a defendant “knowingly” violated each material element of § 922(g)(1) to convict that 
defendant under the federal felon-in-possession ban. See id. at 2196 (“[W]e think that by 
specifying that a defendant may be convicted only if he ‘knowingly violates’ § 922(g), Congress 
intended to require the Government to establish that the defendant knew he violated the material 
elements of § 922(g).”). 
 89. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 1202, 82 Stat. 
197, 236; Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 301, 82 Stat. 1213, 1236. For a more 
detailed history of federal gun regulations, see BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 24, at 42–50 and 
C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 
698–707 (2009). 
 90. Between 1980 and 1992, for instance, the number of suspects investigated and prosecuted 
for federal weapons violations increased four-fold and five-fold, respectively. LAWRENCE A. 
GREENFELD & MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., 
WEAPONS OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS 4 (1995), https://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/woofccj.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5YE8-ZA4V]. 
 91. See FY 2019 Quick Facts, supra note 16, at 1. 
 92. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
STATISTICS 45 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N], https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2018/2018-Annual-Report-
and-Sourcebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/NPT3-7D4U].  
 93. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of 
Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 836 (2001) (“So broad is the reach of 
possession offenses, and so easy are they to detect and then to prove, that possession has replaced 
vagrancy as the sweep offense of choice.”). 
 94. E.g., United States v. Parsons, 946 F.3d 1011, 1014 (8th Cir. 2020); United States v. Smith, 
939 F.3d 612, 614 (4th Cir. 2019). Circuit courts traditionally required the government to prove 
only three elements to convict under § 922(g)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 780 F.3d 260, 
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have liberally construed each of these elements, they are usually easy 
to satisfy.95 
First, the government need only prove that a defendant has a prior 
conviction for a state or federal “crime punishable by imprisonment for 
a term exceeding one year.”96 Whether a defendant has a prior felony 
conviction is undisputed in many cases, either because the defendant 
stipulates as much or because a defendant’s criminal record can be 
easily obtained and verified.97 Importantly, whether a prior conviction 
is a qualifying predicate under § 922(g)(1) depends on whether the 
crime of conviction was punishable by more than a year in prison 
according to the law of the jurisdiction where the conviction was 
obtained, not the actual punishment a defendant received.98 A 
defendant can therefore be barred from possessing a gun for life 
without spending a day in jail.99  
Second, the government must prove that a defendant “knew he 
belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a 
firearm.”100 In other words, the defendant must know that he has 
previously been convicted of an offense punishable by more than a year 
in prison. Complex sentencing statutes and a large divergence between 
 
271 (4th Cir. 2015) (listing three elements required to prove a § 922(g)(1) violation). A fourth 
element, that the defendant also know that he has a qualifying felony conviction for purposes of  
§ 922(g)(1), became a requirement following the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v. United 
States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019). See id. at 2200 (“We conclude that in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g) . . . the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm 
and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a 
firearm.”). 
 95. See infra notes 111–13113, 117, 126 and accompanying text; see also U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 112 (last updated Jan. 22, 2020), https://
www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-112-firearms-charges [https://
perma.cc/39DM-AMXM] (“[Federal firearms violations] are generally simple and quick to 
prove.”). 
 96. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2018). Whether a prior conviction was for a “crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” for purposes of § 922(g)(1) “shall be determined in 
accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.” Id. § 921(a)(20). 
 97. See, e.g., United States v. Benamor, 937 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that, by 
stipulating to being a convicted felon, the defendant relieved the government of its burden of 
proving the defendant’s felon status). 
 98. E.g., United States v. Horodner, 993 F.2d 191, 194 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 99. See, e.g., Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 982 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (affirming the application 
of § 922(g)(1) to an individual who served no jail time for his misdemeanor assault conviction).  
 100. Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019). The court noted that a defendant 
who is unaware that his status disqualifies him from possessing a firearm under § 922(g) “may 
well lack the intent needed to make his behavior wrongful.” Id. at 2197. 
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possible and actual sentences can make it difficult for a person to know 
whether a prior conviction subjects him to § 922(g)(1)’s prohibitions. 
Indeed, this knowledge requirement is the most challenging of 
§ 922(g)(1)’s elements to satisfy.101 Even so, establishing that a 
defendant knew he was a felon is not a difficult hurdle to overcome in 
most cases. A lengthy criminal record, for instance, makes it hard for a 
defendant to claim ignorance of his status as a felon.102 As one court of 
appeals put it bluntly, “Most people convicted of a felony know that 
they are felons.”103 Thus, a defendant’s knowledge of his felon status 
can often be easily inferred from proof that he has previously spent 
more than a year in prison104 or has been convicted of a crime that is 
unequivocally recognized as a felony offense.105  
Third, the government must prove that a defendant (i) possessed 
at some point (ii) what he knew to be a firearm. The statutory 
definition of “firearm” is expansive,106 encompassing unloaded107 and 
even inoperable weapons.108 And § 922(g)(1) prohibits ex-felons from 
 
 101. See, e.g., United States v. Davies, 942 F.3d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 2019) (vacating a § 922(g)(1) 
conviction after concluding that the government failed to show that a defendant knew that he had 
been formally “convicted” under Iowa law at the time of his firearm possession). Rehaif has also 
complicated § 922(g)(1) convictions that were secured before the case announced this knowledge 
requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Balde, 943 F.3d 73, 96 (2d Cir. 2019) (vacating a guilty plea 
regarding a § 922(g) violation after holding that “the failure of the district court to advise [the 
defendant] that the government would need to establish beyond a reasonable doubt at trial that 
he knew that he was illegally present in the United States” amounted to plain error).  
 102. See United States v. Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[S]omeone who has 
been convicted of felonies repeatedly is especially likely to know he is a felon.”). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See, e.g., United States v. Dowthard, 948 F.3d 814, 818 (7th Cir. 2020) (observing that a 
lengthy prison sentence for a prior conviction “severely hamper[s] an assertion” by a defendant 
that he was “ignorant” of his status as someone who had been convicted of a crime punishable by 
more than a year of imprisonment). 
 105. See, e.g., United States v. Burghardt, 939 F.3d 397, 404 (1st Cir. 2019) (inferring that a 
defendant was well aware of his felon status based on his prior convictions for drug and robbery 
offenses, which were “punishable by a term of imprisonment well beyond a year”). 
 106. Under federal law, a “firearm” is defined in relevant part as “any weapon (including a 
starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the 
action of an explosive.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(A) (2018). 
 107. See United States v. Matthews, 520 F.3d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he cases that we 
have found strongly suggest that the other courts of appeals also would reject [defendant’s] 
arguments . . . that momentary possession of an unloaded weapon does not violate section 
922(g).”). 
 108. See United States v. Rivera, 415 F.3d 284, 286 (2d Cir. 2005) (concluding that inoperable 
weapons fall within the federal definition of “firearm” and collecting cases holding the same).  
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possessing ammunition as well.109 In one Sixth Circuit case, for 
instance, the court upheld a fifteen-year mandatory sentence under the 
Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) for a § 922(g)(1) conviction 
that resulted from a consent search of an ex-felon’s home in which 
police uncovered in a drawer seven shotgun shells that a neighbor had 
given to the defendant.110 
Regarding the second subpart of the third element, what 
constitutes “possession” of a firearm under § 922(g)(1) is similarly 
sweeping—courts have interpreted the statute to prohibit “possession 
in every form,” including both actual and constructive possession.111 
Actual possession cases are straightforward—the government simply 
must prove that a defendant carried or physically controlled a firearm 
at some point in time.112 Even a photo showing a defendant holding a 
handgun can show actual possession.113 And a defendant’s motive for 
possessing a firearm is irrelevant, as is the duration of possession.114 In 
short, if an ex-felon is found with a gun or there is evidence that he 
once carried a gun, this possession element is almost certainly 
satisfied.115 
 
 109. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (making it unlawful for a convicted felon to possess “any 
firearm or ammunition”); see also id. § 921(a)(17)(A) (“The term ‘ammunition’ means 
ammunition or cartridge cases, primers, bullets, or propellent powder designed for use in any 
firearm.”). 
 110. See United States v. Young, 766 F.3d 621, 623, 628 (6th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (holding 
that a fifteen-year ACCA mandatory minimum sentence for “innocently acquiring and knowingly 
continuing to possess ammunition” in violation of § 922(g)(1) was not unconstitutionally 
disproportionate). 
 111. Henderson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1780, 1784 (2015). 
 112. See, e.g., United States v. Grubbs, 506 F.3d 434, 439 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Actual possession 
requires that the defendant have ‘immediate possession or control’ of the firearm.”); see also 
United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 279 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[A]bsent unusual 
circumstances . . . the knowledge element in a felon-in-possession case will necessarily be satisfied 
if the jury finds the defendant physically possessed the firearm.”). 
 113. See United States v. Farrad, 895 F.3d 859, 864 (6th Cir. 2018) (affirming a § 922(g)(1) 
conviction where the government relied primarily on Facebook photos portraying the defendant 
holding what appeared to be guns). 
 114. See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert, 430 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 2005) (“The statute in no 
way invites investigation into why the defendant possessed a firearm or how long that possession 
lasted.”). 
 115. See United States v. Johnson, 459 F.3d 990, 998 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing federal 
firearms laws, including § 922(g)(1), as “something approaching absolute liability” (citing United 
States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 479, 484 (9th Cir. 1983))). In certain narrow circumstances, an ex-felon 
can assert “a justification defense” for otherwise unlawful possession of a firearm if such 
possession was needed to avoid an “unlawful and present threat of death or serious bodily injury.” 
See United States v. Gomez, 92 F.3d 770, 775, 778 (1996) (excusing the possession of a shotgun 
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Absent actual possession, a defendant can still be convicted for 
constructively possessing a firearm.116 The government need only 
establish that an ex-felon had the ability to exercise dominion and 
control over a firearm, irrespective of whether he ever wields the 
weapon at any point or whether it formally belongs to someone else.117 
For instance, finding a gun in an ex-felon’s residence is usually 
sufficient to permit the inference that, by virtue of his control of the 
premises, he constructively possessed the gun as well.118 Similarly, an 
ex-felon can constructively possess a firearm found in a car that he is 
driving even if the weapon is concealed and out of reach.119 
When an ex-felon shares a living space, proximity to a gun or the 
ex-felon’s presence in a residence with a weapon is typically not enough 
to establish constructive possession. The government must provide 
additional evidence of a connection between the defendant and the 
firearm at issue.120 But the constructive possession inquiry is fact bound 
and hence largely unpredictable. Consequently, any circumstantial 
evidence linking an ex-felon to a firearm—being a frequent guest in a 
home where a firearm is seized,121 keeping personal belongings in the 
same room as a firearm,122 sleeping near a nightstand where a spouse 
 
for self-defense by an ex-felon who received multiple death threats for cooperating with the 
federal government). Notably, the Gomez court suggested that § 922(g)(1) “might not pass 
constitutional muster” if such a justification defense was deemed unavailable because 
criminalizing an ex-felon’s possession of a firearm when his life is in imminent danger would 
“collide” with what the court described as a Second Amendment right “to defend oneself and 
one’s home against physical attack.” Id. at 774 n.7. This articulation of an individual Second 
Amendment right to self-defense preceded Heller by more than a decade. 
 116. Henderson, 135 S. Ct. at 1784. 
 117. See, e.g., United States v. Morales, 893 F.3d 1360, 1371 (11th Cir. 2018) (stating that a 
defendant could be convicted under § 922(g)(1) “if he was aware of [a] gun’s presence and had 
the ability and intent to exercise dominion and control over it then or later”). 
 118. See, e.g., United States v. Shorter, 328 F.3d 167, 172 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he fact that the 
firearms . . . were found in [the defendant’s] home permits an inference of constructive 
possession.”). 
 119. See, e.g., United States v. Norman, 388 F.3d 1337, 1341–42 (10th Cir. 2004) (confirming 
that a defendant could constructively possess a gun found in a locked glove compartment in his 
car). 
 120. See, e.g., United States v. Ramos, 852 F.3d 747, 754 (8th Cir. 2017) (requiring proof of a 
“link”); United States v. Griffin, 684 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2012) (requiring proof of a 
“nexus . . . connect[ing] the defendant to the contraband”). 
 121. United States v. Johnson, 474 F.3d 1044, 1049 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 122. United States v. Benford, 875 F.3d 1007, 1015 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Kitchen, 
57 F.3d 516, 520–21 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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keeps a handgun,123 or having easy access to a shared closet where guns 
are stored124—might support a finding of constructive possession. The 
only guaranteed way for an ex-felon to avoid exposure to considerable 
criminal liability is to remove firearms from his home entirely. 
Finally, the fourth element is jurisdictional: to support federal 
jurisdiction, the firearm must have some nexus with interstate 
commerce.125 Courts have also construed this element liberally, 
requiring only that a firearm have traveled in interstate commerce at 
some time in the past.126 And given that practically all firearms move 
across states lines at some point between their manufacture and 
ultimate sale, this element is rarely disputed.127 
Once the government secures a conviction, the consequences 
faced by a defendant can be severe. Federal law provides for a 
maximum sentence of ten years for a § 922(g)(1) violation,128 with the 
average sentence for a felon-in-possession offender exceeding five 
years.129 The ACCA,130 moreover, requires a fifteen-year mandatory 
minimum sentence when an offender convicted under § 922(g)(1) has 
three previous convictions for a violent felony or serious drug crime.131 
Even defendants with prior convictions for relatively low-level offenses 
can face a year or two in prison for a single incident of unlawful firearm 
possession.132 
In sum, § 922(g)(1) convictions carry harsh sentences, and courts’ 
liberal interpretations of the statute’s already-broad language make 
 
 123. United States v. Alanis, 265 F.3d 576, 592 (7th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. 
Boykin, 986 F.2d 270, 274 (8th Cir. 1993) (concluding that a defendant constructively possessed 
firearms found in a bedroom that he shared with his wife). 
 124. United States v. Denson, 775 F.3d 1214, 1220 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 125. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2018) (requiring that firearm possession be “in or affecting 
commerce”); United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 2001) (acknowledging that 
Congress enacted the felon-in-possession ban pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority). 
 126. Singletary, 268 F.3d at 200. 
 127. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 394 F.3d 543, 551 (7th Cir. 2005) (confirming that a 
gun’s manufacture in another state is an adequate “interstate connection” for purposes of 
§ 922(g)(1)). 
 128. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). 
 129. FY 2019 Quick Facts, supra note 16, at 2.  
 130. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1005, 98 Stat. 1837, 2138. 
 131. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 
 132. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a)(6) (2018). The lowest base 
offense level for an ex-felon who violates § 922(g)(1) is fourteen, id., which would still result in a 
recommended sentence of fifteen to twenty-one months for a defendant in the lowest criminal 
history category, id. at ch. 5, pt. A. 
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such convictions easy to secure. Given the felon-in-possession ban’s 
worthy purpose of reducing gun violence, its far-reaching scope is no 
doubt deliberate.133 But this breadth also comes with severe 
consequences for ex-felons. By allowing convictions to be based on a 
largely immutable factor (felony status) in combination with easily 
verifiable ones (simple possession of a firearm), the statute ensures that 
enforcement is near effortless,134 making it that much easier for 
prosecutors to facilitate the reentry of ex-felons into the carceral 
state.135 
B. The Federal Felon-In-Possession Ban’s Sweeping Scope 
As explained above, the federal felon-in-possession ban punishes 
firearm possession by ex-felons swiftly and harshly, and its reach is 
expansive by design. The statute’s sweeping scope might be justified if 
it served an especially important government interest. Indeed, the 
“broad objective” of § 922(g)(1) is to “keep guns out of the hands of 
presumptively risky people,”136 and there is no doubt that such an 
interest in preventing crime and gun violence is compelling by any 
metric.137 Yet whether the felon-in-possession ban actually advances 
this interest—and whether, by extension, the ban’s expansive reach is 
necessary and therefore defensible—is highly debatable. 
Start with the fact that § 922(g)(1) punishes any and all firearm 
possession by ex-felons, irrespective of whether a crime occurs or is 
even likely to occur. As explained above, a § 922(g)(1) conviction is 
predicated on possession without regard to motive, so whether an ex-
felon’s firearm possession is associated with any sort of harmful 
behavior worth deterring is irrelevant to § 922(g)(1)’s enforcement.138 
Consequently, because of how § 922(g)(1) is written, courts do not 
 
 133. Levin, supra note 37, at 2205 (“Possessory offenses do not address harm directly; rather, 
they target risks that might ultimately grow into harms. They are a proxy for past, future, or 
ongoing criminality.”). 
 134. See Dubber, supra note 93, at 859 (“In many cases, possession statutes also save 
prosecutors the trouble of proving that other major ingredient of criminal liability in American 
criminal law, mens rea, or a guilty mind.”). 
 135. See id. (“Possession has become the paradigmatic offense in the current campaign to 
stamp out crime by incapacitating as many criminals as we can get our hands on.”).  
 136. United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 683–84 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 137. Id. at 684; Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 989–90 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 138. See, e.g., United States v. Teemer, 394 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that § 922(g)(1) 
“bans possession outright without regard to how great a danger exists of misuse in the particular 
case”). 
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consider whether an ex-felon actually intended to use a firearm for any 
criminal purpose. Instead, they focus almost exclusively on other 
considerations that are not obviously related to gun violence, such as 
whether there is a sufficient “nexus” between the defendant and a gun 
to establish constructive possession.139 To be sure, possessing a firearm 
is an essential first step in any course of action that may ultimately 
result in a dangerous use of that firearm. And in certain cases, 
§ 922(g)(1) arguably preempts such harm by allowing an ex-felon in 
possession of a gun to be incapacitated before criminal behavior 
materializes.140 Yet the fact that the statute preempts gun violence in 
certain cases does not mean that it does so in all or even most cases.141 
Nor does it change the inescapable fact that the likelihood of an armed 
ex-felon putting others in harm’s way or of an ex-felon having any 
intention of harming others is simply not an element of the § 922(g)(1) 
offense.142    
The upshot of § 922(g)(1)’s sweeping scope, of course, is that the 
statute often targets conduct that is nonviolent and unrelated to 
criminal activity. For instance, nearly all of the federal courts of appeals 
have rejected an “innocent transitory possession” defense to a 
§ 922(g)(1) charge.143 Defendants have tried to raise this defense in 
cases where an ex-felon allegedly stumbled upon a firearm and then 
briefly possessed it solely for the innocent purpose of safely turning the 
weapon over to police.144 But courts have consistently held that an ex-
felon’s motive for possessing a firearm, even if wholly devoid of illicit 
intent, is irrelevant under § 922(g)(1).145 Thus, the result in such cases 
is that an ex-felon is re-incarcerated, likely for several years, for 
conduct that in no way jeopardized public safety. In short, under 
§ 922(g)(1), possession of a firearm and possession alone is what 
 
 139. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 896 F.3d 784, 790–91 (7th Cir. 2018) (discussing, among 
other things, whether a defendant was the head of a household and therefore constructively 
possessed a revolver found in a shared residence). 
 140. See supra note 133. 
 141. See, e.g., Davis, 896 F.3d at 791(involving a § 922(g)(1) conviction where the firearms at 
issue were never wielded by the defendant). 
 142. See supra Part II.A. 
 143. See United States v. Vereen, 920 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting that the 
“overwhelming majority” of circuits have rejected a temporary innocent possession defense to a  
§ 922(g)(1) charge and collecting cases). 
 144. E.g., United States v. Mason, 233 F.3d 619, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 145. See Vereen, 920 F.3d at 1308 (“[T]he defendant’s motive or purpose behind his possession 
[of a firearm] is irrelevant.”). 
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matters, regardless of whether harm is imminent or likely. And without 
a consideration of harm, § 922(g)(1) convictions seem disconnected 
with the statute’s purpose of preventing gun violence.  
The federal felon-in-possession ban is disconnected from its 
ostensible purpose for a second reason: it punishes firearm possession 
by violent and nonviolent offenders equally.146 Some argue that this is 
necessary to ensure that lethal firearms are wielded only by “law-
abiding, responsible citizen[s]”147 rather than “presumptively risky 
people.”148 And a felony record of any sort, the argument goes, is useful 
in distinguishing the former from the latter.149 But, as a predictor of an 
individual’s violent tendencies or his risk to the public, the felon label 
is patently overinclusive. Indeed, the term “felony” is regularly applied 
to a wide array of nonviolent conduct. This includes, for example, mail 
fraud150 or marijuana possession,151 offenses that seemingly have little 
bearing on one’s ability to be a responsible gun owner.152 And as the 
list of felonies in state and federal criminal codes continues to grow,153 
the range of nonviolent conduct that can potentially disqualify the 
 
 146. See, e.g., United States v. Pruess, 703 F.3d 242, 247 (4th Cir. 2012) (affirming the 
application of § 922(g)(1) to a nonviolent felon). 
 147. United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. 
Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010)).  
 148. United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 149. See, e.g., Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 448 (7th Cir. 2019) (“The government identifies 
its interest [in enforcing § 922(g)(1)] as preventing gun violence by keeping firearms away from 
persons, such as those convicted of serious crimes, who might be expected to misuse them.”). 
 150. See Hatfield v. Barr, 925 F.3d 950, 951, 953 (7th Cir. 2019) (affirming the application of 
§ 922(g)(1)’s lifetime bar on firearm possession to a defendant previously convicted of mail 
fraud). 
 151. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2018) (providing that a person with a prior drug possession 
conviction who knowingly possesses a controlled substance can be sentenced to up to two years 
in prison). 
 152. See Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second Amendment Limitations and 
Criminological Considerations, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1339, 1363 (2008) (describing as “absurd” the 
“claim that income tax evasion, antitrust law violations, or . . . calling George W. Bush a jackass 
should disqualify anyone from owning a firearm”). 
 153. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 728 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“With the law 
books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding at least 
a technical violation of some act on the part of almost anyone.”); cf. Gary Fields & John R. 
Emshwiller, Many Failed Efforts To Count Nation’s Federal Criminal Laws, WALL ST. J. (July 23, 
2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304319804576389601079728920 [https://
perma.cc/C6TQ-L9H5] (noting the Justice Department’s 1982 attempt to count the total number 
of federal crimes which “produced only an educated estimate” of “about 3,000 criminal 
offenses”).  
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average citizen from ever possessing a firearm under § 922(g)(1) has 
expanded in equal measure. 
Given the expansive definition of what amounts to a felony, there 
is little reason then for a statute targeting violent crime to treat all ex-
felons unconditionally. To the contrary, there are significant 
differences between nonviolent offenders and those who have been 
convicted of violent crimes—or at least enough differences to render 
the blanket disarmament of all ex-felons unwarranted.154 Compared to 
violent offenders in the federal system, for instance, nonviolent 
offenders are considerably less likely to recidivate, and when they do, 
they are rearrested for less serious offenses.155 It simply challenges 
common sense to suggest that the public is equally threatened by an 
armed ex-felon with a history of violent behavior as it is by someone 
whose criminal record is limited to falsifying income on a mortgage 
application.156 
A final argument that could be made to support § 922(g)(1)’s 
sweeping scope is that, rather than targeting the dangerous use of 
firearms, the statute is instead meant to reserve gun ownership 
exclusively to “law-abiding, responsible citizens”—that is, those 
citizens who have committed no crimes at all, whether violent or 
otherwise.157 If this were true, however, § 922(g)(1) is blatantly 
underinclusive on this front by its own terms. Although § 922(g)(1) 
applies to anyone who has been convicted of a crime “punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,”158 any previous 
convictions “pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, 
restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation 
 
 154. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[Section] 922(g)(1) 
may be subject to an overbreadth challenge at some point because of its disqualification of all 
felons, including those who are non-violent.”). 
 155. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL VIOLENT OFFENDERS 3, 8 
(2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/
2019/20190124_Recidivism_Violence.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2KL-LWPS] (finding that among the 
more than 25,000 federal offenders released from prison in 2005, violent offenders recidivated at a 
rate of 63.8 percent while nonviolent offenders recidivated at a rate of 39.8 percent). 
 156. Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152, 154 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (rejecting a Second Amendment 
challenge to § 922(g)(1) by a plaintiff who was prohibited from owning a firearm for life based on 
a prior felony conviction for “falsifying his income on mortgage applications twenty-seven years 
ago”). 
 157. Indeed, such an interpretation of § 922(g)(1) would align with lower courts’ 
interpretation of Heller as restricting the Second Amendment right to such citizens. E.g., United 
States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 158. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2018). 
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of business practices” are specifically excluded from the statute’s 
ambit.159 As other scholars acknowledge, there is no principled 
explanation for this “business practices” exception.160 Arguing that 
perpetrators of these serious offenses161 are somehow more “law-
abiding” or “responsible” than other convicted felons borders on the 
frivolous. And if one instead rationalizes the business practices 
exception as “reduc[ing] unnecessary restrictions” on gun ownership 
for certain white-collar felons who do not exhibit “dangerous 
tendencies,”162 one must wonder what makes those convicted of 
nonviolent crimes unrelated to business practices more dangerous.163 
At bottom, § 922(g)(1)’s expansive reach and punitive nature are 
often defended as essential to advancing the government’s interest in 
reducing gun violence. But given how the statute regularly punishes 
conduct unrelated to criminal activity, needlessly treats nonviolent 
offenders the same as violent ones, and imposes a lifetime ban on 
firearm possession on some lawbreakers but not others, it is time for 
this sweeping and “longstanding prohibition”164 to be reevaluated.  
C. The Federal Felon-In-Possession Ban’s Constitutional Dimension 
and Doctrinal Shortcomings 
Whatever could have been said about the felon-in-possession 
ban’s sweeping scope before Heller, no one at the time could have 
challenged its constitutionality for the simple reason that courts had 
routinely held that nobody, felon or otherwise, was constitutionally 
entitled to possess a firearm in any capacity.165 But Heller’s recognition 
of an individual Second Amendment right to “keep and bear Arms” 
gave § 922(g)(1) an added constitutional dimension. In addition to 
 
 159. Id. § 921(a)(20)(A). 
 160. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 36, at 28 (“Is lying to the F.B.I. about insider trading [like 
Martha Stewart] really more of a threat to the republic than the ‘business practices’ exempted 
from coverage by § 921(a)(20)(A)?”).  
 161. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (making “[e]very contract . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade” a felony punishable by up to ten years in prison). 
 162. United States v. Jester, 139 F.3d 1168, 1171 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 163. See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 609 F.3d 699, 706 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that a prior 
conviction for conspiracy to infringe a copyright does not fall within the business practices 
exception); United States v. Stanko, 491 F.3d 408, 419 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that a prior 
conviction for violating the Federal Meat Inspection Act likewise falls outside the exception). 
 164. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).  
 165. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing the militia-based interpretation of 
the Second Amendment that predated Heller). 
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being expansive, punitive, and robustly enforced,166 the felon-in-
possession ban now, in effect, permanently prohibits a sizable number 
of Americans from engaging in conduct that is otherwise 
constitutionally protected. 
The irony, of course, is that although the Heller Court held that 
the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear 
arms for the purpose of self-defense in the home,167 this is precisely the 
sort of conduct that § 922(g)(1) criminalizes. For one, courts have made 
it clear that an ex-felon’s reason for possessing a firearm is irrelevant 
for purposes of the federal felon-in-possession ban,168 meaning that a 
defendant can be convicted under § 922(g)(1) “even if [he] possesses a 
firearm purely for self-defense.”169 Moreover, under § 922(g)(1), the 
mere presence of firearms in an ex-felon’s residence is effectively 
verboten.170 In short then, the statute’s prohibition on firearm 
possession extends directly into an ex-felon’s home, where the right to 
keep and bear arms is most protected.171 
Despite the felon-in-possession ban’s seeming incompatibility 
with Heller’s central holding, however, circuit courts have routinely 
upheld its constitutionality post-Heller.172 And yet, as several scholars 
note, the reasons these courts commonly give to justify the continued 
exclusion of ex-felons from the Second Amendment’s protections are 
far from satisfying as a doctrinal matter.173 Some courts, for instance, 
have upheld § 922(g)(1) by simply citing to the Heller majority’s carve 
out for “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons.”174 But this language was likely dicta,175 and the Court did not 
 
 166. See supra Parts II.A–B. 
 167. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
 168. E.g., United States v. Vereen, 920 F.3d 1300, 1308 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 169. United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 770 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 170. See supra Part II.A (explaining that seizing a firearm in an ex-felon’s residence is usually 
sufficient to a support a § 922(g)(1) conviction under a theory of constructive possession). 
 171. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (stating that the need for self-defense is “most acute” in the 
home). 
 172. See supra Part I.B. 
 173. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 174. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.  
 175. See, e.g., Winkler, supra note 36, at 1567 (“After all, the laundry list [of exceptions] is 
offered up in the Heller opinion without any reasoning or explanation. Moreover, none of the 
exceptions were formally at issue in Heller . . . . The laundry list was, in a first-year law student’s 
favorite word, dicta.”). But see, e.g., United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 600 n.11 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(asserting that Heller’s list of “presumptively lawful” firearm regulations “was not dicta” and 
instead was a limit on Heller’s holding that was binding on lower courts). 
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cite any laws, cases, or secondary materials to support this 
proposition.176 Other courts have concluded that § 922(g)(1) is 
sufficiently tailored to advance the government’s interest in preventing 
crime and gun violence. 177 Yet, as explained above, such a claim is 
dubious at best given the statute’s sweeping scope.178  
That leaves courts’ reliance on Heller’s language about the Second 
Amendment’s protections extending only to “law-abiding, responsible 
citizens,”179 which has since become a key limit on the scope of the 
“core” Second Amendment right.180 Courts have regularly reasoned, in 
other words, that the individual right to keep and bear arms is reserved 
only for upstanding citizens, and because ex-felons are decidedly not 
part of that group,181 the felon-in-possession ban raises few if any 
constitutional concerns. But this “law-abiding, responsible citizens” 
limit is also doctrinally problematic on at least three fronts.182 
First, the exclusion of ex-felons from the Second Amendment’s 
ambit cannot be derived from the constitutional text. In fact, the text 
supports the opposite conclusion, something which the Heller majority 
itself went a long way to illustrate. The Court insisted, for instance, that 
“the people” referred to in the Second Amendment were identical to 
 
 176. Winkler, supra note 36, at 1567; see also Larson, supra note 36, at 1372 (“The Court 
offered no citations to support this statement, and its ad hoc, patchy quality has been readily 
apparent to commentators . . . . More cuttingly, Justice Breyer suggested that these exceptions 
amounted to little more than ‘judicial ipse dixit.’”).  
 177. Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 990 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 178. See supra Part II.B. 
 179. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
 180. See, e.g., Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 349 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (opinion of 
Ambro, J.) (concluding that criminal offenders can be denied the right to bear arms because they 
are “unvirtuous” for having committed “serious crimes”); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 
683 (4th Cir. 2010) (defining the “core right identified in Heller” as the “right of a law-abiding, 
responsible citizen to possess and carry a weapon for self-defense”). 
 181. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[The defendant] 
simply does not fall within the category of citizens to which the Heller court ascribed the Second 
Amendment protection of ‘the right of law-abiding responsible citizens to use arms in defense of 
hearth and home.’”). 
 182. Some scholars have suggested that the Heller Court adopted this limit on the Second 
Amendment right not because of any underlying constitutional principles but rather to avoid 
having to make the controversial move of invalidating the federal felon-in-possession ban and 
other gun restrictions like it. See, e.g., Larson, supra note 36, at 1372 (acknowledging 
commentators’ speculation that Heller’s endorsement of various “longstanding” gun regulations 
was “compromise language” intended to secure a fifth vote); Winkler, supra note 36, at 1561 (“In 
constitutional law, a right is supposed to define the scope of contemporary government 
regulation. In the Heller world . . . contemporary regulation defines the scope of the right.”). 
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“the people” protected by the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments.183 
And these “people,” according to the Court, “unambiguously” 
included “all members of the political community, not an unspecified 
subset.”184   
Second, the Heller Court’s characterization of prohibitions on 
firearm possession by felons as “longstanding”—and thus presumably 
constitutional—is likely wrong as a historical matter.185 The federal 
felon-in-possession ban is a modern creation.186 The first major federal 
restrictions on firearm use by ex-felons, which targeted individuals 
convicted of a “crime of violence,” were enacted only in 1938.187 And 
prohibitions on simple possession of firearms were first implemented 
and imposed on both violent and nonviolent ex-felons in 1968.188 At the 
very least, the historical support for limiting the Second Amendment 
right to virtuous citizens alone is by no means as conclusive as Heller 
suggests.189  
Third, the “law-abiding, responsible citizens” limit is hard to 
reconcile with what the Heller Court identified as the “central 
component” of the Second Amendment right—the right to self-
defense in case of confrontation.190 The Heller majority claimed that 
the Second Amendment merely codified a preexisting “natural right” 
 
 183. Heller, 554 U.S. at 579–80. 
 184. Id. at 580 (emphasis added). 
 185. See Larson, supra note 36, at 1372 (“The Heller exceptions lack the historical grounding 
that would normally justify an exception to a significant constitutional right. Whatever the Court 
is doing here, it is not rigorously grounded in eighteenth-century sources.”); Marshall, supra note 
89, at 700–08 (2009) (describing the advent of restrictions on firearm possession by convicted 
felons in the 1920s and asserting that “a lifetime ban on any felon possessing any firearm is not 
‘longstanding’ in America”); Winkler, supra note 36, at 1561 (“[Heller’s] ‘laundry list’ of Second 
Amendment exceptions is simply offered up with no discussion whatsoever about how these 
exceptions comply with the Founders’ understanding of the right to keep and bear arms. Heller 
does not cite a single historical source to support these exceptions. Not one.”). 
 186. Marshall, supra note 89, at 698 (“The federal ‘felon’ disability . . . is less than fifty years 
old.”). Marshall also notes “with a good degree of confidence” that state law bans on ex-felons or 
convicts possessing firearms were “unknown before World War I.” Id. at 708. 
 187. Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 75-785, § 1(6), 52 Stat. 1250, 1250 (1938); id. § 2(f), 52 
Stat. at 1251.  
 188. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 1202, 82 Stat. 
197, 236; Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 301, 82 Stat. 1213, 1236. 
 189. See, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Sykes, J., 
dissenting) (noting that scholars “disagree about the extent to which felons . . . were considered 
excluded from the right to bear arms during the founding era” and that “[t]he historical evidence 
is inconclusive at best”).  
 190. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592, 599 (2008). 
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of self-preservation that was—and surely still is—available to 
everyone.191 Yet various commentators point out that it is difficult to 
fathom why ex-felons “don’t . . . have the same right of self-defense as 
everyone else.”192 In short, a “natural right” of seemingly universal 
application purportedly undergirds the Second Amendment’s 
protections, but Heller affords this “natural right” only to an exclusive 
subset of citizens. This surely qualifies as another one of the Heller 
majority’s “conflicting pronouncements” that Justice John Paul 
Stevens underscored in his dissent.193 
In short, Heller, in some sense, was doubly damaging to ex-felons 
who were already subject to a felon-in-possession ban that was harsh 
and punitive in its own right. Not only did the Heller opinion elevate to 
constitutional status the very conduct—possessing a firearm for self-
defense in the home—that the felon-in-possession ban criminalizes, 
categorically excluding ex-felons from the Second Amendment’s 
protections in the process. It also built this categorical exclusion on a 
doctrinal foundation that is both unorthodox194 and unpersuasive. 
Thus, although § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality post-Heller is well-
settled,195 courts have reached this conclusion only by more or less 
writing ex-felons out of the Constitution.  
III.  THE FELON-IN-POSSESSION BAN’S TANGIBLE HARMS  
Scholarship post-Heller roundly criticizes the decision’s reasoning. 
Yet emerging academic debates largely focus on abstract disputes 
about the history and text of the Second Amendment rather than facts 
on the ground, where the felon-in-possession ban continues to be 
 
 191. Id. at 594; see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010) (“Self-defense 
is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day.”). 
 192. Winkler, supra note 36, at 1568; see also, e.g., Blocher, supra note 36, at 426 (“Felons, in 
particular, are likely to move in circles where self-defense is an imperative.”); Levinson, supra 
note 36, at 27–29 (noting that if there is a constitutional right “to defend [oneself] against potential 
sources of physical harm, then Martha Stewart—and millions of other non-violent criminals—
have done nothing that should lead us to strip them of their right”). 
 193. Heller, 554 U.S. at 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 194. See Winkler, supra note 36, at 1563 (“In modern constitutional law, rights are not 
selectively doled out by legislatures to those whom elected officials deem to be sufficiently 
virtuous or worthy.”). 
 195. See Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2019) (observing that “every federal court 
of appeals to address the issue has held that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment 
on its face”). 
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enforced unabated.196 This Part departs from those debates by taking a 
more practical approach. Namely, it addresses the tangible impacts of 
§ 922(g)(1)’s criminalization of gun possession by ex-felons. In 
particular, it describes three distinct harms that the statute inflicts upon 
ex-felons and their communities: first, the extent to which § 922(g)(1) 
burdens ex-felons’ reintegration into society; second, the chilling effect 
the statute has on nonfelons’ exercise of their own Second Amendment 
rights; and finally, the disproportionate burden § 922(g)(1) imposes on 
communities of color.  
A  Burdening Ex-Felons’ Reintegration into Society 
Section 922(g)(1)’s harms are not limited to criminal convictions 
and extended incarceration alone.197 By effectively barring ex-felons 
from living in any residence where firearms are lawfully kept, the 
statute also needlessly complicates their reintegration into society 
following their release from prison. 
Securing stable housing as a formerly incarcerated person is 
difficult in the first place. Landlords routinely refuse to rent to tenants 
with criminal records.198 State and local public housing authorities have 
broad discretion to deny housing assistance to individuals because of 
their criminal history or past involvement with drug-related 
activities.199 In certain cities, a prior criminal conviction can be grounds 
for a multiyear ban from federally assisted public housing.200 Even if 
landlords were willing to overlook criminal records, a combination of 
bleak employment prospects201 and a nationwide shortage of 
 
 196. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra Part I.A. 
 198. See, e.g., Mireya Navarro, Federal Housing Officials Warn Against Blanket Bans of Ex-
Offenders, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2016), https://nyti.ms/1ZY1CIl [https://perma.cc/U8B6-GY5N]. 
 199. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13661(c) (2018) (allowing public housing authorities to deny federal 
housing benefits to applicants based on their criminal history); see also Marah A. Curtis, Sarah 
Garlington & Lisa S. Schottenfeld, Alcohol, Drug, and Criminal History Restrictions in Public 
Housing, 15 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RSCH. 37, 39–40 (2013). 
 200. See Curtis et al., supra note 199, at 43–44. 
 201. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Out of Trouble, But Criminal Records Keep Men Out of 
Work, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2015), https://nyti.ms/1C8KVBq [https://perma.cc/E8XK-TGHH] 
(noting that men with criminal records account for more than one-third of all nonworking men 
ages twenty-five to fifty-four and describing the various employment barriers faced by ex-felons). 
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affordable housing202 puts most of the private rental market out of 
reach for many ex-felons. Unsurprisingly then, formerly incarcerated 
people are nearly ten times more likely to experience homelessness 
than the general public.203 And homelessness in turn increases the risk 
of reincarceration, both because it destabilizes ex-felons’ return to 
society204 and because local authorities criminalize homelessness itself 
in a variety of ways.205 
The federal felon-in-possession ban exacerbates an already dire 
housing problem for a vulnerable group. This is because § 922(g)(1)’s 
expansive scope, when combined with strict supervised release 
conditions,206 can effectively render an ex-felon’s preferred residence 
unsuitable if firearms are kept in the home by a roommate or family 
member. Under these circumstances, ex-felons face an unenviable 
choice. They can try to convince their cotenants to part ways with their 
firearms, risk revocation of their supervised release or conviction for 
constructive possession of a weapon, or find somewhere else to live. 
The scale of this particular housing hurdle is potentially 
substantial. Roughly 40 percent of American adults live in a gun-
owning household, 207 all of which would be effectively off-limits to ex-
felons unwilling to risk a constructive possession charge. For anyone 
subject to the federal felon-in-possession ban, finding housing in a 
country with nearly four hundred million guns208 could be an 
unexpected ordeal. Living in the United States with a felony record is 
 
 202. See NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH: THE HIGH COST OF HOUSING 
1, 4–6 (2018), https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/oor/OOR_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/G59W-
7YL7]. 
 203. See Lucius Couloute, Nowhere To Go: Homelessness Among Formerly Incarcerated 
People, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Aug. 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/housing.
html [https://perma.cc/3NF3-A9NP]. 
 204. Id.  
 205. See Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and 
Human Rights on His Mission to the United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/33/Add.1, 
at 12 (2018), http://undocs.org/A/HRC/38/33/ADD.1 [https://perma.cc/96Q3-FZKT] (“In many 
[American] cities, homeless persons are effectively criminalized for the situation in which they 
find themselves.”). 
 206. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(8) (2018) (authorizing a sentencing court to require that a 
defendant “refrain from possessing a firearm” during his term of supervised release). 
 207. John Gramlich & Katherine Schaeffer, 7 Facts About Guns in the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR. 
(Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/22/facts-about-guns-in-united-
states [https://perma.cc/8WTV-YXJ2]. 
 208. GIFFORDS LAW CTR., supra note 86 (estimating that there are roughly 393 million 
firearms in the United States).  
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challenging enough. And § 922(g)(1), among its many harms, makes 
ex-felons’ return to society needlessly harder. 
B. Chilling Nonfelons’ Exercise of Their Second Amendment Right 
One aspect of § 922(g)(1) that often goes unaddressed is the 
collateral damage it inflicts on people outside of the criminal justice 
system.209 The robust enforcement of the federal felon-in-possession 
ban effectively chills the Second Amendment rights of nonfelons who 
choose to live with loved ones with a felony record. There are several 
reasons why lawful gun purchasers may choose to own a firearm, from 
hunting and recreation to self-defense. Two-thirds of gun owners claim 
that protection is the primary reason for owning a firearm, and nearly 
30 percent of female gun owners say protection is the sole reason they 
own one.210 In short, Americans often choose to own firearms for the 
“core lawful purpose of self-defense.”211  
But the federal felon-in-possession ban makes exercising this 
Second Amendment right a risky proposition for those who live with 
loved ones with felony records. Simply having the ability to “exercise 
dominion and control” over a firearm is often enough for an ex-felon 
to constructively, and thus unlawfully, possess a firearm under 
§ 922(g)(1).212 Consequently, because a nonfelon keeping a gun in the 
home does not necessarily exclude an ex-felon from jointly 
“possessing” it,213 an ex-felon can face a criminal conviction for merely 
living somewhere where he knows firearms are kept, even if those 
firearms are stored in a locked compartment214 or are formally 
 
 209. But see United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 601 (3d Cir. 2012) (“We are mindful of the 
risk that felon dispossession statutes, when combined with laws regarding accomplice liability, 
may be misused to subject law-abiding cohabitants to liability simply for possessing a weapon in 
the home.”); Marshall, supra note 89, at 734 (describing the federal felon-in-possession ban as 
“go[ing] beyond even stripping the convict of the entire core of the [Second Amendment] right, 
by pressuring those who share his household to disarm themselves as well, to avoid the risk of the 
convict’s being prosecuted for unlawful possession based on theories of joint or constructive 
possession”). 
 210. Gramlich & Schaeffer, supra note 207. 
 211. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008). 
 212. See supra Part II.A. 
 213. See, e.g., United States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 136–37 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[Section] 
922(g)(1) does not require proof of actual or exclusive possession; constructive or joint possession 
is sufficient.”). 
 214. See United States v. Rivers, 355 F. App’x 163, 165–66 (10th Cir. 2009) (upholding a 
defendant’s § 922(g)(1) conviction although police recovered the weapons from a locked 
compartment to which the defendant did not have a key). 
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“owned” by a spouse or family member.215 Courts of appeals have 
emphasized, of course, that an ex-felon’s “mere proximity” to a gun or 
his mere presence in a residence where a gun is kept is not sufficient to 
prove constructive possession under § 922(g)(1).216 But deciding 
whether certain factors establish the requisite “nexus”217 between an 
ex-felon and a specific firearm involves a fact-intensive and 
unpredictable inquiry that offers nonfelons little guidance.218  
United States v. Griffin219 illustrates the dilemma faced by gun 
owners who live with ex-felons. After moving in with his parents 
following his release from federal prison, the defendant in Griffin, an 
ex-felon, was later convicted under § 922(g)(1) after police found 
ammunition and ten firearms in his parents’ home.220 Because the 
firearms belonged to the defendant’s father, who was an avid hunter, 
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the government had failed to 
sufficiently demonstrate that the defendant “intended to exercise 
control” over his father’s guns, and the court reversed the defendant’s 
conviction.221 But this reversal came more than four years after the 
defendant was initially arrested.222 For most nonfelons, exercising their 
Second Amendment rights simply will not be worth the risk of having 
their ex-felon loved ones endure years of trials and appeals in federal 
court. 
Indeed, nonfelons who take the risk of both living with an ex-felon 
and keeping firearms in the home may ultimately face criminal liability 
themselves. Consider United States v. Huet.223 The defendant in that 
case shared a home with her boyfriend, who had a prior federal 
 
 215. See, e.g., United States v. Alanis, 265 F.3d 576, 592 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding it immaterial 
that the defendant’s wife owned the firearm because constructive possession can be joint). 
 216. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 684 F.3d 691, 696 (7th Cir. 2012) (“We have explained 
repeatedly that mere proximity to contraband is not enough to establish a sufficient nexus to 
prove constructive possession.”). 
 217. Id. at 695 (quoting United States v. Morris, 576 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2009)). 
 218. Compare United States v. Kitchen, 57 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding constructive 
possession where guns were seized in a bedroom in the defendant’s girlfriend’s residence that also 
contained the defendant’s jewelry and clothes), with Griffin, 684 F.3d at 698–99 (finding no 
constructive possession where the defendant moved into his parent’s house where several 
firearms were later found).  
 219. United States v. Griffin, 684 F.3d 691 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 220. Id. at 693–94. 
 221. Id. at 693, 699. 
 222. The defendant in Griffin was arrested in April 2008, id. at 693, and the case was decided 
by the Seventh Circuit in July 2012, id. at 691. 
 223. United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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conviction for possessing an unregistered firearm and thus was subject 
to the federal felon-in-possession ban.224 After police seized a rifle in 
the couple’s upstairs bedroom while executing a search warrant, the 
government indicted the boyfriend with illegal possession of the 
weapon under § 922(g)(1).225 Yet despite being able to lawfully possess 
a firearm herself, the defendant was indicted as well for aiding and 
abetting her boyfriend’s unlawful firearm possession.226 In holding that 
this aiding and abetting charge did not violate the defendant’s Second 
Amendment rights, the Third Circuit acknowledged the risk that a 
felon-in-possession ban, when combined with laws regarding 
accomplice liability, might be “misused to subject law-abiding 
cohabitants to [criminal] liability simply for possessing a weapon in the 
home.”227 But the court then insisted that the defendant’s right to keep 
a firearm in the home “did not give her the right to facilitate” her 
boyfriend’s unlawful possession of one.228 And because the 
government had sufficiently alleged both that the defendant knew her 
boyfriend was barred from possessing a firearm and that she had 
knowingly aided and abetted his possession of a firearm anyway, the 
government’s case against the defendant could proceed.229 
The federal felon-in-possession ban thus presents millions of 
nonfelons who have family members involved in the criminal justice 
system230 with an unappealing choice as well: keep firearms in the home 
or live with their loved ones. They cannot do both. 
 
 224. Id. at 592–93. 
 225. Id.  
 226. Id. at 593. The government charged the defendant under a general federal aiding and 
abetting statute, which provides that, “Whoever commits an offense against the United States or 
aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.” 
18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2018). 
 227. Huet, 665 F.3d at 601. 
 228. Id. at 602. 
 229. Id. at 596, 603. 
 230. In 2016 alone, roughly 626,000 people were released from state and federal correctional 
authorities, meaning that hundreds of thousands of households have family members who were 
formerly incarcerated. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PRISONERS IN 2016: 
SUMMARY 1 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16_sum.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EZU-
9YZ7]. 
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C. Targeting Communities of Color 
Finally, every aspect of the American criminal justice system is 
intimately connected with race,231 and the federal felon-in-possession 
ban is no different. Criminalizing the use and possession of firearms 
disproportionately impacts the Black community. Of the 7,647 
convictions under § 922(g)(1) in fiscal year 2019, more than 55 percent 
of the offenders were Black, which was more than twice the percentage 
of white offenders (24.8 percent)232 and more than four times the 
percentage of Black Americans in the general population.233 Racial 
disparities are especially stark in the context of firearms offenses. 
Nearly 53 percent of defendants convicted of any federal gun crime 
were Black, which exceeded the percentage of Black offenders in every 
other category of federal crime save robbery (58.1 percent).234 
Among the myriad explanations for such racially disparate 
outcomes, at least two are salient. First, Black Americans are 
overrepresented in the criminal justice system to begin with.235 For 
instance, given that an estimated 33 percent of adult Black males have 
a felony conviction compared to 13 percent of all adult males,236 simple 
math dictates that Black men are more likely to have a predicate felony 
necessary for a § 922(g)(1) charge compared to other demographic 
groups. Second, as with many other aspects of the criminal justice 
system, people of color have plainly “b[orne] the brunt of 
enforcement” of the nation’s gun crimes for decades.237 New York 
 
 231. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012) (detailing how the War on Drugs and other law 
enforcement policies have disproportionately harmed communities of color and facilitated the 
mass incarceration of Black men). 
 232. FY 2019 Quick Facts, supra note 16, at 1. 
 233. QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/
US/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/Y3VA-WF66] (indicating that African Americans comprise 
approximately 13.4 percent of the total U.S. population). 
 234. 2018 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 92, at 48. 
 235. See THE SENT’G PROJECT, FACT SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 5 (2018), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/trends-in-u-s-corrections [https://perma.cc/
K935-CNPT] (noting that Black men are six times as likely to be incarcerated as white men 
and that one in three Black men born in 2001 are likely to be incarcerated at some point in 
their lifetime). 
 236. Shannon et al., supra note 28, at 1807. 
 237. See Levin, supra note 37, at 2194–99 (detailing racial disparities in the criminal regulation 
of gun possession); see also Maya Schenwar, Opinion, Reduce Gun Penalties, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
14, 2014), https://nyti.ms/1iLDByg [https://perma.cc/E39Y-5GS3] (“In fact, a black person is 
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City’s infamous stop-and-frisk policy—which a federal district court 
found unconstitutionally targeted young of men of color238—aimed to 
tackle gun violence and illegal gun possession.239 
Yet statistics about § 922(g)(1) convictions alone fail to fully 
capture the potential scale of this inequality. Because of their felony 
records, nearly a quarter of Black adults have been permanently 
stripped of the right to lawfully possess firearms.240 And given the de 
facto racial and socioeconomic segregation that persists in many 
American cities,241 the federal felon-in-possession ban effectively 
disarms large swaths of communities of color. The dynamics of this 
phenomenon are not complicated. Ex-felons returning to society are 
disproportionately of color because convicted felons are.242 These same 
ex-felons return to predominantly Black or Latino neighborhoods in 
urban areas where affordable housing or family networks (or both) 
exist. Taking advantage of these networks, they move in with spouses, 
family members, or roommates. And because the risk of a § 922(g)(1) 
conviction makes it unwise for these ex-felons to be anywhere near a 
firearm, the spouses and family members with whom these ex-felons 
choose to live are themselves effectively barred from possessing 
firearms—a dilemma discussed above and one which is particularly 
prevalent in communities of color given the overrepresentation of 
nonwhite offenders in the criminal justice system.243 Consequently, in 
certain nonwhite neighborhoods with large concentrations of ex-felons 
living with their friends and loved ones, any possession of a gun might 
give rise to criminal liability of some sort. 
 
nearly twice as likely to face a mandatory minimum carrying charge than a white person who is 
prosecuted for the same conduct.”). 
 238. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that 
New York City’s stop-and-frisk policy used indirect racial profiling). 
 239. See Levin, supra note 37, at 2202 (mentioning, in reference to New York City’s stop-and-
frisk policy, that “it was guns as much, if not more so, than drugs that justified the aggressive and 
intrusive practice”).  
 240. See Shannon et al., supra note 28, at 1807. 
 241. See, e.g., John Eligon & Robert Gebeloff, Affluent and Black, and Still Trapped By 
Segregation, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2bvF9m5 [https://perma.cc/N8F8-66ZY] 
(describing various census figures indicating that “[n]ationally, black and white families of similar 
incomes still live in separate worlds”). 
 242. See THE SENT’G PROJECT, supra note 235, at 5. 
 243. See supra Part III.B. 
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Sadly, the residents of these communities have perhaps the 
strongest claim to needing a firearm for self-defense.244 To say that gun 
violence unduly affects Black Americans is an understatement.245 Close 
to 60 percent of Black adults say they personally know someone who 
has been shot with a firearm either accidentally or intentionally.246 
Roughly half of all homicide victims in the United States are Black,247 
despite Black Americans comprising only 13 percent of the general 
population.248 And Black males between the ages of twenty and thirty-
five are seventeen times more likely to be killed by a firearm than their 
white counterparts.249 The disproportionate victimization of Black 
Americans has motivated several communities to pass stricter gun 
control laws in the hopes of making those communities safer. The 
District of Columbia handgun ban struck down in Heller was passed by 
a majority-Black city council with overwhelming support from the 
city’s majority-Black population.250 But the fact that Black Americans 
are, statistically speaking, far more likely to be victims of gun violence 
than those from other demographic groups also gives them especially 
compelling reasons for exercising their Second Amendment right to 
armed self-defense. In some sense then, the felon-in-possession ban 
disproportionately disarms the very people who are most likely to find 
themselves needing to defend their hearth and home.  
Yet an armed Black man in an urban community simply does not 
comport with the popular image of the “law-abiding, responsible” gun 
owner, whether that be a gun-wielding rural white male or a white 
woman defending herself from an assailant.251 Consequently, as  
 
 244. See, e.g., Winkler, supra note 36, at 1568. 
 245. See Michael B. de Leeuw, Dale E. Ho, Jennifer K. Kim & Daniel S. Kotler, Ready, Aim, 
Fire? District of Columbia v. Heller and Communities of Color, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 
133, 148–52 (2009) (citing several nationwide statistics to support the claim that “the brunt of 
[handgun] violence is borne by people of color”). 
 246. Gramlich & Schaeffer, supra note 207. 
 247. See VIOLENCE POL’Y CTR., BLACK HOMICIDE VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 
AN ANALYSIS OF 2017 HOMICIDE DATA 1 (2020), https://vpc.org/studies/blackhomicide20.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A569-ARA6] (noting that there were 7,809 Black homicide victims in the 
United States in 2017). 
 248. Quickfacts, supra note 233. 
 249. THE EDUC. FUND TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE, GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: AN 
ANALYSIS OF 2018 CDC DATA 10 (2020), https://efsgv.org/wp-content/uploads/Gun-Violence-in-
America_An-Analysis-of-2018-CDC-Data_February-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/FSR9-2X72]. 
 250. See de Leeuw et al., supra note 245, at 167 (“[T]he Heller decision effectively silenced 
the democratic will of a majority African-American electorate.”).  
 251. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 37, at 2193 (“One consequence of the political Right’s support 
for gun rights is the popularization of the image of the gun owner as rural white male.”). 
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§ 922(g)(1)’s disparate impact on communities of color make clear, the 
“people” of the Second Amendment may be equal in theory, but they 
are hardly so in practice. 
IV.  A WAY FORWARD 
Given the federal felon-in-possession ban’s harms, one might ask: 
Where should lawmakers, ex-felons, and their family members go from 
here? Of course, lethal firearms should not come into the hands of 
dangerous people. And federal and state governments have a 
compelling interest in using criminal sanctions to deter and punish gun 
crimes. But, for § 922(g)(1), the ends of protecting the public do not 
justify the statute’s blunt means. This Note, therefore, proposes a few 
solutions that could potentially mitigate § 922(g)(1)’s myriad harms. 
First, Congress should rewrite the statute so as to circumscribe its scope 
on a number of fronts. Second, even if the political will to assist ex-
felons is lacking, ex-felons should continue to bring as-applied 
challenges to § 922(g)(1) in federal court. Finally, nonfelons living with 
family members who are ex-felons should bring constitutional 
challenges against § 922(g)(1), claiming that the statute unduly burdens 
their Second Amendment right to keep firearms in the home for self-
defense. 
A. Rewriting the Statute 
Rewriting § 922(g)(1) would be the easiest path to achieving 
widespread and immediate change. Section 922(g)(1) could be refined 
in multiple ways. Congress should start by imposing a felon-in-
possession ban on a more limited subset of ex-felons—namely, those 
who have been convicted of violent crimes.252 The Federal Firearms Act 
that was enacted in 1938, for instance, limited its restrictions on firearm 
possession to “any person who has been convicted of a crime of 
violence,”253 which the statute defined with an enumerated list of 
 
 252. See Marshall, supra note 89, at 728–30 (recommending that firearm disabilities be limited 
to “convictions indicating that one actually poses some danger of physically harming others rather 
than simply being dishonest or otherwise unsavory”). 
 253. Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 75-785, § 2(f), 52 Stat. 1250, 1251 (1938). In 1968, 
Congress expanded the federal felon-in-possession ban to cover all felons, including nonviolent 
offenders, in response to a spate of high-profile assassinations in the 1960s and the civil unrest 
that characterized the decade. See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 24, at 49–50.  
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obviously violent offenses.254 Congress could do something similar with 
the current felon-in-possession ban, either by enumerating a new set of 
disqualifying violent offenses or simply incorporating into § 922(g)(1) 
the definition of “violent felony” that already exists in other federal 
criminal statutes such as the ACCA.255 Reducing the number of 
felonies that trigger the felon-in-possession ban would ensure that a 
substantial number of ex-felons would no longer be permanently 
disarmed for nonviolent offenses that arguably have little bearing on 
their ability to be responsible gun owners.256 
Congress could likewise limit where the felon-in-possession ban 
applies. For example, ex-felons could be prohibited from carrying 
firearms in public, where the risk of harming or intimidating others is 
most acute.257 But their ability to safely “keep” firearms in the home 
for self-defense could otherwise remain unfettered.258 Such a home-
based restriction would go a long way toward resolving the tension 
between § 922(g)(1)’s broad reach and Heller’s emphasis on a 
constitutional right to use “arms in defense of hearth and home.”259 A 
more narrowly tailored law would also ensure that § 922(g)(1) 
convictions punish dangerous conduct that involves more than just the 
mere possession of firearms in an ex-felon’s residence. 
Finally, § 922(g)(1) could be revised so that the current lifetime 
prohibition on firearm possession imposed on ex-felons is replaced by 
a ban with a shorter and more reasonable duration. One option for 
Congress would be to follow the lead of other states and criminalize 
firearm possession by an ex-felon only for a limited period of time after 
 
 254. Federal Firearms Act § (6), 52 Stat. at 1250 (defining “crime of violence” as including 
murder, manslaughter, rape, kidnapping, burglary, assault with intent to kill, and similar violent 
offenses).  
 255. The ACCA defines a “violent felony” in relevant part as a “crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” that either “has as an element the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” or is “burglary, arson, or 
extortion, [or] involves use of explosives.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2018). 
 256. See supra notes 146–53 and accompanying text. 
 257. See Marshall, supra note 89, at 731 (suggesting that the history of gun regulations 
supports stripping those convicted of a crime of any right “to carry [firearms] openly off his 
premises”). 
 258. See Miller, supra note 36, at 1280 (arguing that individuals should have a “robust right” 
to possess firearms in the home that is subject to substantial government restrictions elsewhere). 
 259. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
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that person’s release from incarceration, which would then be followed 
by an automatic restoration of the ex-felon’s gun rights.260  
Alternatively, Congress could make it easier for ex-felons to 
individually petition for the restoration of their gun rights after a 
certain time period following their disqualifying conviction, a process 
that would better allow for a case-by-case assessment of the risk posed 
by a prospective gun owner.261 In fact, such restoration procedures at 
the state level currently allow thousands of ex-felons every year to not 
only have their state gun rights restored262 but also to escape the 
shadow of potential criminal liability under § 922(g)(1).263 Congress 
could do well to replicate the state systems that most effectively 
balance rights restoration with the general interest in public safety. Or 
it could simply revive the restoration process that already exists under 
federal law. Section 925(c) authorizes the attorney general to restore 
gun rights to any individual barred from possessing a firearm under 
federal law if certain conditions are met,264 but this procedure has been 
defunct for nearly thirty years due to a lack of appropriated funds from 
Congress.265 Whichever option Congress may ultimately pursue, a 
more circumscribed statute would no doubt be more sensible than 
 
 260. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04(a) (West 2021) (barring ex-felons from 
possessing firearms for up to five years after their release from prison or mandatory supervision, 
whichever is later); see also Michael Luo, Felons Finding It Easy To Regain Gun Rights, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 13, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/14/us/felons-finding-it-easy-to-regain-
gun-rights.html [https://perma.cc/F9S4-PFN2] (“Today, in at least 11 states . . . restoration of 
firearms rights is automatic, without any review at all, for many nonviolent felons, usually once 
they finish their sentences, or after a certain amount of time crime-free.”). 
 261. Several states have similar restoration procedures that, for better or worse, allow those 
with state felony convictions to have their gun rights restored with little to no discretionary review. 
Luo, supra note 260. 
 262. See, e.g., id. (observing that 3,300 ex-felons and people convicted of domestic violence 
misdemeanors have regained their gun rights in Washington State since 1995 under the state’s 
gun rights restoration statute). 
 263. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2018) (providing that “[a]ny conviction which has been 
expunged[] or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored” 
does not qualify as a disqualifying felony conviction under § 922(g)(1)). 
 264. See id. § 925(c) (authorizing the attorney general to restore an individual’s gun rights if 
it is established that “the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety 
and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest”). 
 265. See United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 74–75 (2002) (acknowledging this appropriations 
bar on the federal restoration process); see also H.R. REP. NO. 102-618, at 13–14 (1992) (justifying 
the appropriations bar by noting that the restoration process is costly, time-consuming, and 
ultimately involves “guess[ing] whether a convicted felon . . . can be entrusted with a firearm”). 
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indiscriminately stripping violent and nonviolent offenders alike of 
their right to possess a firearm for life.  
Given that ex-felons have long been a disfavored constituency, 
federal legislators may have little interest in expending political capital 
on revising a statute to make it more difficult to convict ex-felons of 
possessing firearms. But the potential benefits of such reforms are 
substantial, ranging from preventing the needless reincarceration of 
ex-felons hoping to return to society and mitigating racial disparities in 
the criminal justice system to reducing burdens on the judicial system 
and facilitating the use of nonpunitive means to address crime and gun 
violence. For lawmakers committed to criminal justice reform, tackling 
§ 922(g)(1)’s harms directly would be time well spent.  
B. Bringing As-Applied Challenges to § 922(g)(1) Convictions 
Moving from Congress to the courts, ex-felons previously 
convicted of nonviolent offenses should continue to bring as-applied 
challenges against § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on possessing firearms.266 
The chance of success is miniscule. Only one circuit court has ever 
upheld an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1).267 Moreover, courts have 
determined that nonviolent offenses such as driving under the 
influence268 and making a false statement to a lending institution are 
sufficiently serious to “remove[] one from the scope of the Second 
Amendment” entirely.269 And various factors for determining whether 
a nonviolent ex-felon can be entrusted with a firearm—including the 
passage of time since the ex-felon’s conviction, evidence of his 
rehabilitation, his likelihood of recidivism, and his contributions to his 
community since his offense—have been dismissed by some courts as 
irrelevant to the as-applied inquiry.270 
Despite these unfavorable odds, doctrinal development only 
happens through litigation. Thus, as courts continue to hear as-applied 
challenges to §922(g)(1), they will be compelled to explain time and 
again why certain ex-felons who are fully rehabilitated and 
unthreatening still deserve to be permanently stripped of their right to 
defend themselves with a firearm. Regardless of whether these 
 
 266. See supra Part I.B. 
 267. Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 339 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc).  
 268. Holloway v. Att’y Gen., 948 F.3d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 2020). 
 269. Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152, 154, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 270. See id. at 160 (stating that such factors cannot “un-ring the bell of [an ex-felon’s] 
conviction” and deeming them irrelevant in as-applied challenges brought by convicted felons). 
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challenges spark major doctrinal change or merely entrench the status 
quo, they will at least ensure that § 922(g)(1)’s sweeping scope remains 
top of mind for federal judges.  
C. Bringing Constitutional Challenges to § 922(g)(1) 
Perhaps the most successful challenges to § 922(g)(1) will come 
not from the ex-felons who are directly targeted by the statute but 
instead from family members who choose to live with them. Nonfelons 
living with an ex-felon could assert that § 922(g)(1) indirectly yet 
impermissibly burdens their core Second Amendment right to keep 
firearms in the home for self-defense.271 The burden would be indirect, 
of course, because the nonfelon could never be prosecuted personally 
for violating § 922(g)(1). But a nonfelon must still ensure a loved one 
is not held criminally liable for his or her own gun possession—by 
consistently storing a firearm in such a way that places it beyond the 
loved one’s “domain and control” or keeping the firearm outside of the 
home at all times. These precautions burden the nonfelon’s ability to 
fully use the weapon for self-defense. Owning a firearm, while 
theoretically possible, is essentially impracticable.  
Ezell v. City of Chicago272 suggests that even attenuated burdens 
on the right to armed self-defense can amount to a Second Amendment 
violation. There, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a Chicago 
ordinance mandating that gun owners participate in one hour of 
training at a firing range while prohibiting any firing ranges within city 
limits impermissibly burdened the owners’ Second Amendment 
rights.273 The ordinance did not ban firearm possession outright, nor 
was such possession impossible. Indeed, as a practical matter, most 
gunowners could have satisfied the mandatory one-hour training 
requirement by driving to a shooting range in the suburbs.274 According 
to the Ezell court, however, this possibility of compliance did not save 
the ordinance. That gun owners could not satisfy the requirement in 
 
 271. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 698 (7th Cir. 2011) (describing the “core 
Second Amendment right” as the right “to possess firearms at home for protection”). 
 272. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).  
 273. Id. at 710. The Seventh Circuit heard the case at the preliminary injunction stage and 
thus only concluded that the challengers had a “strong likelihood of success on the merits.” Id. 
But the court still suggested that it was very unlikely that Chicago city officials could “muster 
sufficient evidence to justify [under intermediate scrutiny] banning firing ranges everywhere in 
the city.” Id.  
 274. Id. at 697. 
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Chicago was enough of a burden on their “right to maintain proficiency 
in firearm use” to render the ordinance in violation of the Second 
Amendment.275 And if the inconvenience of driving to a distant 
shooting range for a one-hour training session burdens an individual’s 
Second Amendment right, then a statute that puts a gun owner’s loved 
ones at risk of criminal sanctions is surely just as burdensome. 
Of course, challenging the burdens imposed by § 922(g)(1) on 
nonfelons under such a theory would be novel, which would in turn 
require navigating at least a few major procedural hurdles. It is unclear, 
for instance, whether the potential or actual prosecution of a family 
member with a felony record under § 922(g)(1) would constitute a 
“concrete and particularized” injury sufficient to confer Article III 
standing to that ex-felon’s nonfelon loved ones.276 When precisely a 
nonfelon plaintiff suffers a constitutional injury caused by § 922(g)(1)’s 
enforcement could also be a pivotal question.277 A gun purchase by a 
nonfelon that ultimately leads to a loved one with a felony record being 
charged under § 922(g)(1) for constructive possession of a firearm 
could amount to an emotional injury sufficient to confer standing. And 
a purchase that results in a loved one actually being convicted and 
incarcerated almost certainly would.278 But fine distinctions could 
prove fatal to such a case’s justiciability. For example, whether a 
nonfelon plaintiff actually purchases a firearm or merely intends to do 
so, and whether such a purchase actually causes a loved one with a 
felony record to be charged under § 922(g)(1) or merely enhances the 
likelihood of such a charge, could be dispositive.279  
 
 275. Id. at 698. 
 276. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (describing the elements of 
Article III standing and requiring that an injury for such purposes be “concrete and 
particularized” as well as “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’” (citation 
omitted)).  
 277. The ripeness doctrine requires that federal courts only hear cases where the facts “have 
developed sufficiently to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made.” Ripeness, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). A case involving a plaintiff who has not yet been “immediately 
harmed, or immediately threatened with harm” in a legal sense is unripe and thus nonjusticiable. 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 504 (1961) (plurality opinion).  
 278. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2416 (2018) (“[A] person’s interest in being united 
with his relatives is sufficiently concrete and particularized to form the basis of an Article III 
injury in fact.”). 
 279. See, e.g., Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 374–78 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d sub 
nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding that residents who merely 
expressed an intention to violate the District of Columbia’s handgun ban lacked standing to sue 
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At bottom, a litigation strategy involving nonfelons bringing 
constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1) remains wholly untested, and 
the likelihood of prevailing in such a case is uncertain. But then again, 
the idea that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to 
possess a firearm was considered fanciful not so long ago.280 Nonfelons 
hoping to challenge § 922(g)(1)’s harms will never know their odds of 
success until they try. 
CONCLUSION 
Designing sensible and effective firearms regulations to 
counteract gun violence is undoubtedly a worthy goal.281 But the 
federal felon-in-possession ban is a blunt and punitive remedy that is 
unacceptably damaging in its own right. Its sweeping scope ensures that 
anyone with a felony conviction who comes into possession of a gun 
can be easily, unconditionally, and harshly punished. It 
indiscriminately targets nonviolent offenders as well as conduct wholly 
unrelated to criminal activity. And, as this Note addresses, it exacts 
tangible harms on ex-felons and their communities—from 
complicating their reentry into society, to burdening the Second 
Amendment rights of their nonfelon family members, to effectively 
disarming entire neighborhoods.   
That the felon-in-possession ban is also incompatible with the 
spirit of Heller makes the current status quo all the more indefensible. 
Those who advocate for a robust constitutional right to “keep and bear 
Arms” should be troubled by a statute that permanently strips a sizable 
portion of the populace of that same right. And those pushing for 
criminal justice reform should be equally troubled by a statute that 
funnels ex-felons back into prison for conduct that is often noncriminal 
and otherwise constitutionally protected. When needed change will 
come or what form it will take remains to be seen. But it is high time to 
rethink the role of this sweeping and damaging statute in a post-Heller 
world. 
 
but Dick Heller, who had applied for and been denied a registration certificate to own a handgun, 
had suffered an injury sufficient to support standing). 
 280. See Michael Waldman, How the NRA Rewrote the Second Amendment, POLITICO (May 
19, 2014), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/05/nra-guns-second-amendment-106856 
[https://perma.cc/V22L-KWWR].  
 281. See John Gramlich, What the Data Says About Gun Deaths in the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR. 
(Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/08/16/what-the-data-says-about-
gun-deaths-in-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/AM2N-REHG] (noting that over 39,000 people died from 
gun-related injuries in the United States in 2017). 
